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JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in determining there was no easement relating to the 
Subject Property where the purported easement was never recorded against the property, 
there never had been any evidence on the ground of an easement, the path of the 
supposed easement had been blocked for twenty years by impassable berms and for ten 
years by storage sheds and there had been mesne conveyances of the property to bona 
fide purchasers? 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in granting summary judgment on Holladay Towne 
Center's claims for breach of the Ground Lease based on a claim that the property was 
encumbered by an easement when the Ground Lease demised the property "together with 
all . . . easements . . . in any way appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any 
surface easements. . . ?" (R. at 13). And specifically authorized the tenant, "at its own 
cost and expense, to contest or review by appropriate legal or administrative proceeding 
the validity or legality of any . . . covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or hereafter 
of record which may be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises . . . 
T (R. at 11, 20-21). 
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ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL: 
Issue: Did the Trial Court err in failing to find that the Holladay Towne Center's 
pattern of intentionally late rental payments for the express purpose of forcing Brown 
Family Holdings to undertake action that was not the Landlord's/Brown Family 
Holdings' responsibility under the Ground Lease, and Holladay Towne Center's filing of 
a frivolous easement action against Brown Family Holding, while there was no easement 
as a matter of law, constituted a material breach of the lease? (R. at 928 pgs. 13-29, 32). 
Standard of review: The trial judge concluded as a matter of law that the 
accepted facts did not amount to a material breach of the lease. Such a determination is a 
"question of law that the appellate court reviews for correctness, according no deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 
1179, 1183 (Utah 2002); see also Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (citing McKeon v. Williams. 799 P.2d 198, 200 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)); see 
also State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's 
conclusions of law no deference but instead review them for correctness."); see also State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("'[Correctness' means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial court's 
determination of law."). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a lawsuit asserted by Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C. 
("HTC") a large developer, the tenant, against a small business owner Brown Family 
Holdings, L.C. ("Brown"). In March of 2005, HTC and Brown entered into a lease 
agreement ("Ground Lease"). Prior to entering into the Ground Lease, HTC procured a 
title report that did not show any type of easement over the Subject Property. The 
Ground Lease covers only lot 27 ("Subject Property"). An adjoining lot, lot 26 is not a 
part of the transaction between these parties, but is owned by a third party. The Ground 
Lease that is the subject of this matter contains the standard covenant that HTC will have 
quiet enjoyment of the leasehold. (R. at 33). Specifically, and contrary to the allegations 
of HTC, there is no covenant that the property would be free of encumbrances. (R. at 9-
38). Nor would one expect such a covenant in a lease. The Ground Lease contains an 
option to purchase the property, but that option has not been exercised by HTC. (R. at 31 
and R. at 578). The Ground Lease expressly gives HTC the right to remove any 
encumbrances that may be on the Subject Property. (R. at 20-21). 
The easement which HTC claims to be an encumbrance on the property does not 
appear of record on the Subject Property. (R. at 543). An independent title expert 
verified that no easement was on the Subject Property. (R. at 543). The expert 
specifically determined, "after reviewing the relevant title documents, at no time was any 
type of easement recorded against lot 27 from 1980 until the present date." (R. at 543). 
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The only document of record, recorded only against lot 26, and not lot 27, were two 
documents called a notice of contract. (R. at 603-605). In the 1980 notice of contract it 
was set out that lot 26 was under contract and included in the legal description was a 
purported easement over lot 27. (R. at 603-605; see also R. at 535-536). The 1980 
notice of contract is not a conveyance of lot 26 and did not transfer any interest to any 
easement for title policy reasons. (R. at 543). After recording the notice of contract on 
lot 26, nothing happened for several years. (R. at 535). Then, the owner of both lots 26 
and 27 conveyed lot 27 free and clear of any easements in 1984. (R. 606 and 535). After 
the 1984 conveyance of lot 27, Ralom Investment Company, the previous owner of lot 27 
and present owner of lot 26, did not own lot 27 and thus could not convey an easement 
over lot 27. (R. at 535). The fee simple conveyance of lot 27 in 1984 conveyed clear 
title that was not subject to an easement. (R. at 543). In 1993, after lot 27 had been 
conveyed free and clear of any easement, Ralom Investment Company, who no longer 
owned lot 27, purported to convey lot 26 with an easement over lot 27 to Ben Aire 
Associates via warranty deed. (R. at 608-610; 535). The 1993 warranty deed to Ben 
Aire Associates was not recorded against lot 27. (R. at 608-610; 535). None of the 
conveyances of lot 27 ever included a reference to the purported easement on lot 27. (R. 
at 613-624). The purported easement on lot 27 will not impede acquisition of financing. 
(R. at 543). There is no physical evidence of the so-called easement. Indeed, the path of 
the claimed easement has been blocked for over twenty years by impassable berms, and 
for the past ten years the path has been blocked by storage units that Brown constructed 
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on the Subject Property. (R. at 544). 
Since November of 2005, HTC has been perpetually late paying rent in a bad faith 
manner. (R. at 579). In June, 2006, HTC began delaying payment of rent in bad faith for 
over 25 days each month. (R. at 579). After HTC filed a lawsuit against Brown, Brown 
sent a letter to HTC on September 18, 2006, and gave notice to HTC that it was in breach 
of the Ground Lease because of the late payments and because of the meritless lawsuit. 
(R. at 394, 847-848). HTC refused to dismiss the lawsuit even though it has no merit and 
is a material breach of the Ground Lease. In addition, as HTC did not dismiss the lawsuit 
pursuant to the September 18, 2006, letter within 30 days as required by the notice and 
Ground Lease, HTC is in unlawful detainer of the Subject Property. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
HTC filed suit against Brown on August 9, 2006, asserting claims for declaratory 
judgment, breach of contract, and specific performance. On September 18, 2006, Brown 
filed a motion to dismiss HTC's claims. The motion to dismiss was converted into a 
motion for summary judgment because the parties submitted affidavits supporting their 
claims. On November 15, 2006, Brown was forced to file a Counterclaim because HTC 
would not dismiss the lawsuit brought on August 9, 2006. HTC filed a motion to dismiss 
Brown's claims. At about the same time, HTC filed a motion for summary judgment and 
then Brown filed a motion for summary judgment. All the claims were combined into the 
summary judgment motions. On March 12, 2007, oral argument was held by the Trial 
Court. Oral argument regarding the order and attorney fees was also heard on May 1, 
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2007. 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
After review of the pleadings and oral argument before the Trial Court on March 
12, 2007, the Trial Court determined that HTC did not have a claim against Brown. The 
Trial Court determined that Brown was the prevailing party and awarded attorney fees to 
Brown. (R. at 928). The Trial Court also determined that even though HTC's conduct 
was not excusable in withholding payments and filing a meritless lawsuit against Brown, 
it was not a material breach of the lease agreement and dismissed Brown's counterclaims. 
(R. at 928). HTC then contested the award of attorney fees and the proposed order and 
another hearing was held on May 1, 2007 regarding the order and the amount of attorney 
fees awarded. (R. at 928). The Trial Court made a specific award of attorney fees 
excluding attorney fees expended after HTC began making rent payments on time. HTC 
filed a Notice of Appeal on June 18, 2007. Brown filed a Notice of Appeal on June 27, 
2007. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Brown Family Holdings, L.C. ("Brown") and Holladay Towne Center, 
L.L.C. ("HTC"), a large developer, entered into a Ground Lease covering the Subject 
Property in March 2005. (R. at 9-38). 
2. The Ground Lease covers lot 27. (R. at 9-38). 
3. The adjoining parcel to lot 27 is lot 26. (R. at 603-605). 
4. Prior to entering into the Ground Lease with Brown, HTC procured a title 
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report for the leasehold interest that did not show any type of easement on the Subject 
Property. (R. at 531 and 591-601). 
5. The Ground Lease that is the subject of this matter contains the standard 
covenant that HTC will have quiet enjoyment of the leasehold. (Ground Lease Article 21 
- R. at 33). 
6. Specifically, and contrary to the allegations of HTC, there is no covenant 
that the property would be free of encumbrances. Nor would one expect such a covenant 
in a lease. (See Ground Lease - R. at 9-38). 
7. The Ground Lease contains an option to purchase the property, but that 
option has not been exercised by HTC. (Ground Lease Article 16 - R. and Supplemental 
Affidavit of Rand Brown 17- R. at 578). 
8. Now, because of HTC s default it can never exercise that option. 
9. The Ground Lease also expressly gives HTC the right to remove any 
encumbrances that may be on the Subject Property. (See Ground Lease - R. at 20-21). 
10. Paragraph 6.3 of the Ground Lease provides "[tjenant shall have the right, 
at its own cost and expense, to contest or review by appropriate legal or administrative 
proceeding the validity or legality of any such Legal Requirement . . . ." (See Ground 
Lease - R. at 20). 
11. Legal Requirement is defined as "all covenants, restrictions, and conditions 
now or hereafter of record which may be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of 
the Premises . . . . " (See Ground Lease - R. at 11). 
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12. The easement which HTC claims to be an encumbrance on the property 
does not appear of record on this property. (See 1994 Title Report - R. at 582-589; Title 
Insurance Policy 2004 - R. at 591-601; Affidavit of Michael Moss, % 13 - R. at 543). It 
does not appear today, it did not appear when the property was leased by HTC, nor when 
the property was purchased by Brown Family Holdings. (Supplemental Affidavit of 
Rand Brown - R. at 577-580). 
13. An independent title expert verified that no easement was on the Subject 
Property. (R. at 543). 
14. The expert specifically determined, "after reviewing the relevant title 
documents, at no time was any type of easement recorded against parcel 27 from 1980 
until the present date." (Affidavit of Michael Moss, 1J 9 - R. at 543). 
15. The expert further determined that "the purported easement against parcel 
27 never was a valid easement and has no validity for title policy purposes." (Affidavit 
of Michael Moss ^ 6 - R. at 543). 
16. After review of all the documentation in the case and having examined the 
facts relating to the physical characteristics of the ground in this case, a reasonable title 
search would not reveal the alleged encumbrance, since there was no indication of the 
alleged encumbrance. (Affidavit of Michael Moss, ^ 15 at 544). 
17. The only documents of record, recorded only against lot 26, and not lot 27, 
were two documents called a notice of contract. (R. at 603-605). 
18. In the notice of contract it was set out that lot 26 was under contract and 
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included in the legal description was a purported easement over lot 27. (R. at 603-605; 
see also R. at 535-536). 
19. The 1980 notice of contract is not a conveyance of lot 26 and did not 
transfer any interest to any easement for title policy reasons. (Affidavit of Michael Moss, 
% 1 - R. at 543). 
20. After recording the notice of contract on lot 26, nothing happened for 
several years. (R. at 535). 
21. Then, the title owner of both lots 26 and 27 conveyed lot 27 free and clear 
of any easements in 1984. (R. at 606 and 535). 
22. After the 1984 conveyance of lot 27, Ralom Investment Company, the 
previous owner of lot 27 and present owner of lot 26, did not own lot 27 and thus could 
not convey an easement over lot 27. (R. at 535). 
23. The fee simple conveyance of lot 27 in 1984 conveyed clear title that was 
not subject to an easement for title policy reasons. (Affidavit of Michael Moss, \ 8 - R. at 
543). 
24. In 1993, after lot 27 had been conveyed free and clear of any easement, 
Ralom Investment Company, who no longer owned lot 27, purported to convey lot 26 
with an easement over lot 27 to Ben Aire Associates via warranty deed. (R. at 608-610; 
535). 
25. The 1993 warranty deed to Ben Aire Associates was not recorded against 
lot 27. (R. at 608-610; 535). 
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26. None of the conveyances of lot 27 ever included a reference to the 
purported easement on lot 27. (R. at 613-624). 
27. The purported easement on lot 27 will not impede acquisition of financing. 
(Affidavit of Michael Moss, ^ 12 - R. at 543). 
28. There is no physical evidence of the so-called easement. Indeed, the path 
of the claimed easement has been blocked for over twenty years by impassable berms, 
and for the past ten years the path has been blocked by storage units that Brown 
constructed on the property. (Affidavit of Michael Moss, ^ 14 - R. at 544). 
29. No one has ever asserted any rights under the purported easement. (R. at 
579). 
30. HTC began "putting pressure" on Brown by not paying rent on the first of 
the month as required under the Ground Lease. Instead, HTC would not pay the rent. 
After the 15 day grace period expired, Brown had its lawyers write a letter demanding 
payment of rent. Ten days thereafter, HTC would pay the rent. This conduct went on for 
several months. HTC admitted it engaged in this gamesmanship with regard to rent in 
order to put pressure on Brown. (R. at 577-580, 409). 
31. The Ground Lease specifically prohibits this type of conduct. The Ground 
Lease specifically states: 
This is a triple net lease, tenant agrees that the amount of annual rent will 
be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all impositions and costs 
relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating 
to the property during the term or any extension of the lease. 
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(R. at 14, Art. 3.1(a)). 
32. Since November of 2005, HTC has been perpetually late paying rent in a 
bad faith manner. (Supplemental Affidavit of Rand Brown - R. at 577-580). 
33. Brown never acquiesced to the late payments and has made continual 
demands for on time payments. (Supplemental Affidavit of Rand Brown - R. at 577-
580). 
34. After HTC filed suit against Brown, Brown sent a letter to HTC on 
September 18, 2006, and gave notice to HTC that it was in breach of the Ground Lease in 
several particulars. (R. at 394, 847-848). 
35. Specifically, Brown stated that HTC was in breach of paragraph 22.9 of the 
Ground Lease which reads: 
Except where a party hereto is specifically permitted to act in its sole and 
absolute discretion, each party hereto agrees to act reasonably and in good 
faith with respect to the performance and fulfillment of terms of each and 
every covenant of condition contained in the Lease. 
(R. at 394, 34). 
36. After receiving the September 18, 2006, letter from Brown, contrary to 
HTC's prior conduct of intentionally delaying rent payments, HTC began to make the 
rent payment much closer to the appropriate date. (R. at 394). 
37. The September 18, 2006, letter also gave notice under paragraph 12(c) that 
filing the lawsuit against Brown was a material breach of the Ground Lease. (R. at 394, 
847-848). 
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38. The September 18, 2006, letter also stated "[t]he above breaches of the 
Ground Lease must be cured within 30 days or Brown Family Holdings will be forced to 
pursue an action under the unlawful detainer statute and seek an award of attorney fees 
and costs as a result of your client's actions." (R. at 847). 
39. Article 12.1(c) of the Ground Lease reads in relevant part: 
(c) Tenant shall have failed to perform any term, covenant, or condition of 
this Lease to be performed by Tenant, except those requiring the payment 
of money, and Tenant shall have failed to cure same within thirty (30) days 
after written notice from Landlord, delivered in accordance with the 
provisions of this Lease, where such failure could reasonably be cured with 
said thirty (30) day period . . . . 
(R. at 27-28). 
40. HTC did not dismiss the lawsuit as required by the September 18, 2006, 
letter. (R. at 394). 
41. On November 15, 2006, as HTC did not comply with the notice and 
dismiss the pending lawsuit, Brown filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and 
unlawful detainer requesting relief for HTC's material breach. (R. at 393). 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's T| 4 - BFH was obligated under the Lease to deliver possession of the 
Property on March 1, 2005, subject only to the Permitted Exceptions. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. The Ground Lease 
speaks for itself and does not support this statement. (R. at 524; 9-38). The Ground 
Lease does not require Brown to rent the real property without an easement. (R. at 9-38). 
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Indeed, Brown leased the Premises, "together with all . . . easements . . . in any way 
appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any surface easements. . . . " Ground 
Lease at Article 1.1. (R. at 13). 
Appellant's ^ 6 - Holladay was never informed of any encumbrances on the 
Property. Further, the only Permitted Exception identified pursuant to the terms of the 
Lease was for property taxes and assessments accruing for the year 2005 and thereafter. 
Response: The first sentence of this paragraph is supported by the record as 
there was no encumbrance. The title policy obtained by HTC showed that the supposed 
easement was never recorded against the Subject Property. (R. at 531 and 591-601). The 
second sentence, however, is not supported by the record. Article 1.1 entitled "Demise" 
states "[l]andlord hereby leases to Tenant the Premises, together with all. . . easements . . 
. in any way appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any surface easements . . . 
. " (R. at 13). In addition, this statement violates the parol evidence rule and should be 
excluded. (R. at 345-352, 505-508).2 
Appellant's f^ 7 - During Lease negotiations, Holladay made it clear to BFH that 
Holladay's purpose in leasing the Property was to include it as part of Holladay's larger 
commercial development project to develop, build, and market a large shopping center in 
the area. Holladay further made it clear that Holladay planned to demolish existing 
structures and construct new improvements. Holladay required the Lease to reflect this 
2
 The Trial Court never ruled on Defendant Brown's motion to strike the affidavit of 




Response: This statement is not allowable based on the parol evidence rule. (R. 
at 345-352, 505-508). 
Appellant's ^ 9 - Holladay also required that the Lease allow Holladay to obtain 
financing to construct the planned improvements on the Property. The Lease specifically 
allows Holladay to use its leasehold interest and the improvements as collateral for such 
financing. 
Response: HTC is again attempting to include parol evidence which is 
inadmissible. (R. at 345-352, 505-508). 
Appellant's % 10 - In order to use the Property as intended by Holladay, the 
Property must be free from encumbrances that will block or prohibit its development or 
construction of improvements. 
Response: This statement contains inadmissible parol evidence. (R. at 345-352, 
505-508). 
Appellant's ^ 11 - BFH's representation in the Lease that there were not other 
encumbrances on the Property except for the property taxes was a material and integral 
part of Holladay's decision to enter the Lease. 
Response: As to the assertion that Brown represented there were not other 
encumbrances on the property, this assertion is not supported by the record. There is no 
covenant in the Ground Lease that the property is being leased free of all encumbrances. 
Indeed, Brown leased the Subject Property, "together with all . . . easements . . . in any 
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way appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any surface easements. . . ." (R. at 
13). Beyond that, this statement violates the parol evidence rule and is inadmissible. (R. 
at 345-352, 505-508). 
Appellant's f 12 - In the early part of 2006, Mr. Thomas Hulbert's (manager of 
Holladay) review of a survey map revealed that an easement may exist over the Property 
in favor of the adjoining lot, lot 26. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. Mr. Hulbert is not an 
expert and cannot make a legal conclusion about the existence of a purported easement. 
(R. at 345-352, 505-508). 
Appellant's % 13 - After investigating this further, Mr. Hulbert determined that the 
Easement existed. Holladay then asked its attorney to notify BFH of this easement and 
request that BFH take the necessary action to remove the easement as required by the 
Ground Lease. 
Response: Mr. Hulbert is not an expert and cannot make a legal conclusion 
about the existence of a purported easement that is not recorded against lot 27. (R. at 
345-352, 505-508). 
Appellant's ^ 14 - By letter dated April 7, 2006, Holladay's attorney informed 
BFH of the Easement and of their resultant default under the Ground Lease. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. Brown was never in 
default under the Ground Lease. There is no easement. (R. at 543). 
Appellant's |^ 15 - Despite repeated requests by Holladay, BFH refused to take any 
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action to remove the Easement, arguing instead that the Easement was of no force or 
effect. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. There is no easement. 
(R. at 543). 
Appellant's If 17 - Mr. Capilli's research revealed that prior to August, 1980, Lot 
26 and Lot 27 were owned by the same owner and that in August, 1980, Lot 26 was 
transferred with an easement for parking, and ingress and egress over a portion of Lot 27 
and that the easement remained on the transferring documents up to Lot 26's current 
owner. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. This statement is 
contrary to the documents attached to the Affidavit of Mr. Capilli. The title documents 
show that a notice of contract was recorded, but does not reflect any type of conveyance. 
Lot 27 was conveyed in 1984 without any reference to an easement. Thereafter, none of 
the conveying documents relating to lot 27 had any reference to an easement. (R. at 613-
624). 
Appellant's % 18 - Mr. Capilli provided this information to Mr. Hulbert, and then 
on May 31, 2006, Mr. Capilli met with Mr. Hulbert, Rand Brown, and Pamela Brown 
regarding his findings. Mr. Capilli explained to them that he would not be able to issue a 
title insurance policy for the Property, without excepting the Easement from coverage 
under such policy. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. Mr. Capilli's office 
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had in fact already issued a title insurance policy to HTC before HTC ever entered into 
the Ground Lease. (R. at 531 and 591-601). In the meeting described above, Mr. Hulbert 
was trying to strong arm Brown into renegotiating the Ground Lease by creating the 
spectre of an easement that was not of record. (R. at 363). 
Appellant's 1f 20 - First American Title Insurance Company stated that it will not 
issue a title policy for the Property without listing the Easement as an exception to 
coverage, regardless of whether it is an owner's policy or a lender's policy of title 
insurance. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. Mr. Capilli's office 
had in fact already issued a title insurance policy to HTC before it ever entered into the 
Ground Lease. (R. at 531 and 591-601). The purported easement on lot 27 will not 
impede title insurance or the acquisition of financing. (Affidavit of Michael Moss, ^ 12 -
R. at 543). 
Appellant's ^ 21 - Instead of fulfilling its obligation under the Ground Lease to 
remove the Easement, BFH argued and continues to argue to Holladay that the Easement 
is invalid. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. The Ground Lease is 
devoid of any language that requires Brown to remove any easement, especially an 
easement that does not exist. (R. at 9-38). Instead, the Ground Lease puts the onus on 
the tenant "at its cost" to pursue any such action. (R. at 14, Art. 3.1(a)). 
Appellant's ]f 23 - As a result of the existence of the Easement, Holladay is unable 
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to develop or construct the improvements on the Property, or obtain financing for the 
same. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. Mr. Hulbert does not 
have sufficient foundation as to his ability to make such a determination. (See Brown's 
motion to strike the affidavit of Mr. Hulbert- R. at 345-352, 505-508). Further, the 
purported easement on lot 27 will not impede acquisition of financing. (Affidavit of 
Michael Moss, 112 - R. at 543). 
Appellant's ^ 24 - The location of the Property makes it unique for Holladay's 
desired development. 
Response: This statement is precluded by the parol evidence rule. (R. at 345-
352, 505-508). 
Appellant's f^ 25 - BFH admits that it will be obligated to remove the Easement if 
Holladay exercises its option to purchase the Property under the Lease, and if the 
Easement holder asserts his right to use it. 
Response: This statement is not supported by the record. The Reply 
Memorandum actually states "[i]f Plaintiff were attempting to exercise it's option (which 
is not available for several years), it might be a different story. But that is a different 
story for a different day if it ever comes about. That issue is simply not ripe." (R. at 
360). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Brown owns a parcel of real estate known as lot 27, Peony Gardens ("Subject 
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Property")- In March of 2005, HTC and Brown entered into a Ground Lease regarding 
lot 27. The Ground Lease, a triple net lease, provides that rent would be paid without 
offset and without cost to the landlord. The Ground Lease further authorizes the tenant to 
contest, at its own expense, any legal requirements, defined as including any covenants, 
restrictions, or conditions of record which would include contesting the easement alleged 
in this case if the tenant had a genuine concern about the easement. The Ground Lease 
also provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in legal actions relating to the 
Ground Lease. 
In about 1980, Peony Gardens, who owned lots 27 and 26, recorded a notice of 
contract on lot 26 that described an easement across lot 27. That notice of contract was 
never recorded against lot 27. 
Later, lot 27 was conveyed to Brown's predecessor in title with no mention of the 
easement. Through mesne conveyances, none of which mention the easement, lot 27 
came into the possession and ownership of Brown. An easement was never recorded 
against lot 27, and there is no evidence of an easement on the ground. In fact, for at least 
the past two decades, the path of the easement has been impassable because a berm is in 
the way. For the last 10 years, permanent storage facilities have been built upon the path 
of the purported easement. Furthermore, nobody has ever made a claim to the easement 
or attempted to use it. Also, nobody has ever tried to interfere with HTC's quiet 
enjoyment of its leasehold on account of the easement. At the time the two parties 
entered into the Ground Lease, neither had knowledge of the alleged easement. 
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Despite the decades with no legal or actual recognition of the unrecorded 
easement, on August 9, 2006, HTC filed a complaint against Brown in Third District 
Court seeking declaratory relief, breach of contract, and specific performance, claiming 
that the easement is a violation of the Ground Lease. 
Prior to and after the filing of the lawsuit, HTC withheld rent payments habitually 
and for the express purpose of trying to strong-arm Brown into taking action and 
incurring cost, which under the Ground Lease, HTC covenanted not to do. For several 
months prior to September, 2006, HTC did not pay rent. Each month Brown had to hire a 
lawyer to send a demand letter to HTC in order to collect the rent that was withheld until 
after that demand letter was received. In this fashion the tenant, HTC, caused Brown, on 
a regular basis, to incur costs to collect the rent contrary to the Tenant's express covenant 
to pay the rent without cost to the Landlord. A formal notice of default letter, stating that 
the habitual withholding of rents and the lawsuit filed against Brown was a material 
breach of the Ground Lease, was sent to HTC on September 18, 2006. 
In November, 2006, Brown filed a counterclaim for unlawful detainer under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-8, asserting that the lawsuit and HTC's pattern of not making rental 
payments until Appellant had hired a lawyer to demand payment were in breach of the 
Ground Lease by violating both the express covenants of the Ground Lease and the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and causing Brown to incur costs in connection 
with the collection of rents. 
The Trial Court correctly found that there is no easement affecting this property. 
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The purported easement was never recorded against the property in question that has now 
passed through the hands of several bona fide purchasers. There has never been any 
indication on the ground of this purported easement. 
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of March 16, 2007, Third 
Judicial District Court Judge John Paul Kennedy stated, "Because there is no easement 
affecting lot 27, there is no basis for the HTC's claims against the defendant and this 
action should not have been brought against the landlord, causing the landlord to incur 
costs." (See \ 2, Conclusions of Law - R. at 827) (Emphasis added). 
The Judge also rightfully called HTC's pattern of late payments, as well as the 
filing of the action against Brown, "not appropriate conduct." (See ^ 4, Conclusions of 
Law - R. at 828). 
However, the Judge erred in his legal conclusion that despite HTC's inappropriate 
conduct in bringing the action and its inappropriate conduct in habitually delaying rent 
payments, HTC's actions did not constitute a material breach of the Ground Lease. 
Brown is appealing this determination by the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HTC PROCURED A TITLE REPORT ON LOT 27 BEFORE THE 
GROUND LEASE WAS SIGNED IN 2005 AND IT DID NOT SHOW 
THE PURPORTED EASEMENT. 
HTC procured title insurance covering lot 27 on December 22, 2004. The 
purported easement was not "excepted" from the 2004 title report procured by HTC — by 
the same title insurance company that is now asserting that an easement, that was never 
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recorded against lot 27, somehow affects the title. To the extent that HTC is attempting 
to persuade this Court that Brown had some ill intent, such assertions must be 
immediately dismissed. Further, Section 1.1 of the Ground Lease states Brown is 
delivering possession of the Property "subject to the following matters to the extent they 
affect the [Property]: (a) The Permitted Exceptions to the extent valid and subsisting and 
affecting the Premises as of the Effective Date . . . ." The Effective Date is defined as 
"all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or hereafter of record which may be 
applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises . . . ." (See Ground Lease 
Agreement - R. at 11). In reality, as far as the parties were concerned, Brown did deliver 
possession of the Subject Property with no knowledge of any title issues as attested by 
the Title Report procured by HTC. 
II. THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT ENCUMBERED BY THE 
PURPORTED EASEMENT. 
Brown is the owner and Lessor of lot 27. There is nothing recorded against lot 27 
that gives notice of or even mentions the supposed easement. HTC tries to create a cloud 
on the title of lot 27 by reference to documents recorded against lot 26. The law simply 
will not support that assertion. The only documents of record, recorded only against lot 
26, and not lot 27, were two documents called a notice of contract. (R. at 603-605). In 
the notice of contract it was set out that lot 26 was under contract and included in the 
legal description was a purported easement over lot 27. (R. at 603-605; see also R. at 
535-536). After recording the notice of contract on lot 26, nothing happened for several 
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years.3 (R. at 535). Then, the owner of both lots 26 and 27 conveyed lot 27 free and 
clear of any easements in 1984. (R. at 606 and 535). After this point in time, Ralom 
Investment Company, the owner of lot 26, did not own lot 27 and thus could not 
thereafter convey an easement over lot 27. (R. at 535). In 1993, after lot 27 had been 
conveyed free and clear of any easement, Ralom Investment Company who no longer 
owned lot 27, purported to convey lot 26 with an easement over lot 27 to Ben Aire 
Associates via warranty deed. (R. at 608-610). That warranty deed was not recorded 
against lot 27. (R. at 613-624). None of the conveyances of lot 27 ever included a 
reference to the purported easement. (R. at 613-624). Therefore, there is no legal 
argument that can be made that lot 27 is subject to an easement. 
As asserted previously, when lot 27 was purchased, a title report was done and the 
purported easement did not show up. Brown did not have notice of any purported 
easement. There is nothing on the ground that would give a purchaser notice of the 
purported easement. Indeed, the route of the easement has been impassable since before 
Brown purchased the property. Storage units have now been on the real property 
covering the path of the claimed easement for over ten years and the purported easement 
has never been used. The owner of lot 26 has never asserted any right to lot 27. Surely a 
dispute cannot exist where a legally insupportable easement has never been asserted. In 
3
 This factual scenario is also consistent with the Doctrine of Merger. "A servitude is 
terminated when all the benefits and burdens come into a single ownership. Transfer of a 
previously benefited or burdened parcel into separate ownership does not revive a 
servitude terminated under the rule of the section." (RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY § 7.5 2000). 
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addition, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-103 the following law is applicable: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Id 
Under the facts provided by HTC, Brown has free and clear title pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §57-3-103 as Brown paid value and did not have notice of any recorded 
easement against lot 27. Further, the Ground Lease itself is but another in a long chain of 
transactions by bona fide purchasers who have paid value in connection with lot 27 with 
no actual or constructive notice of the purported easement. 
HTC argues that the Trial Court should not have ruled on whether or not an 
easement was in existence. (HTC's brief, pg. 15-16). That argument might make some 
sense if there were a colorable argument that an easement exists. But in this case, HTC 
could just as easily argue that an owner of property in Wyoming has an easement over lot 
27. Where the purported easement has never been recorded against lot 27 and there has 
never been any physical indication of the easement, there is no colorable claim that this 
property was ever encumbered. The Trial Court determined that as to HTC and Brown, 
there was not an easement problem. (R. at 828). 
For the first time on appeal, HTC is attempting to argue that the owner of lot 26 is 
an indispensable party. This argument makes little sense because HTC was the plaintiff 
and should have included the owner of lot 26 in the action if it thought such a person was 
24 
an indispensable party. Further, the Trial Court granted leave to HTC to amend the 
complaint to include the owner of lot 26, if HTC so desired. HTC chose not to. (R. at 
828). It is too late to now argue a failure to add an indispensable party. 
III. THE GROUND LEASE DOES NOT REQUIRE BROWN TO CLEAR 
TITLE. 
HTC continues to argue that the Ground Lease requires Brown to file a quiet title 
action and get clear title as to an easement recorded against another lot. One searches in 
vain to find any such language in the Ground Lease. There is no language in the Ground 
Lease that says if an easement appears post hoc recorded against another lot, Brown must 
file a quiet title action and remove the easement or a breach exists and HTC is entitled to 
specific performance. In reviewing the Ground Lease, it is clear that no warranty of title 
exists. In fact Article 1.1 entitled "Demise" states 
[l]andlord hereby leases to Tenant the Premises, together with all rights, 
privileges, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in any way 
appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any and all surface 
easements, rights, titles, and privileges of Landlord now or hereafter 
existing in and to adjacent streets, sidewalks and alleys for the Term, at the 
rental, and upon all of the covenants and conditions set forth herein. 
(R. at 13). 
Appertaining is defined as "pertain or relate." Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 72 (1994). This language would clearly encompass an undisclosed easement 
recorded against another parcel of land. Further, it is highly unlikely that a quiet title 
action could be maintained against a lien, never recorded, never asserted, and which does 
not interfere with the Brown's uses or HTC's quiet enjoyment of the property. 
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IV. THE GROUND LEASE AUTHORIZES HTC TO FILE A QUIET TITLE 
ACTION IF IT SO DESIRES. 
This very situation was contemplated by the Ground Lease. The Ground Lease 
allows HTC to spend its money pursuing this ephemeral problem, if HTC so desires. 
Pursuant to paragraph 6.3 the "[tjenant shall have the right, at its own expense, to contest 
or review by appropriate legal or administrative proceeding the validity or legality of any 
such Legal Requirement . . . ." (R. at 20-21). Legal Requirement is defined as "all 
covenants, restrictions, and conditions now or hereafter of record which may be 
applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises, or to the use, occupancy, 
possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or restoration of any of the 
Premises . . . ." (R. at 11). Instead of exercising its right under the Ground Lease, HTC 
filed a frivolous suit to attempt to force Brown to comply with terms that do not exist, 
expending money to cure a problem that does not exist. The frivolous lawsuit constitutes 
a material breach of the Ground Lease agreement and Brown is entitled to a judgment 
and an order of restitution excluding HTC from Lot 27. 
HTC argues that somehow the express terms of the Ground Lease that authorize 
HTC to take care of the easement, if HTC so desires, somehow really does not give this 
ability to HTC. HTC cited the Elder v. Nephi case for the assertion that HTC did not 
have standing to bring a quiet title action. 164 P.3d 1238 (Utah 2007). Contrary to 
HTC's assertion, the question in the Elder case was "whether and to what extent a 
plaintiff may in the course of prosecuting a tort claim seek to impose upon an unwilling 
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defendant a property interest based on principles of prescription or adverse possession." 
Id. at 1243. Ultimately, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff did not 
have standing to claim a property interest on behalf of the railroad. Id. at 1244. The 
Elder Court specifically held that 
[b]ecause we see no reason why these well-established standing 
requirements should not extend to claims by prescriptive easement, we 
decline to extend our rules to permit a party to create a property interest in a 
third party for the purpose of exposing that party to liability for damages. 
Although a circumstance may arise in which we might find appropriate the 
creation of a prescriptive right by proxy, we do not face that circumstance 
here. 
Id. at 1244. 
The facts of the Elder case have nothing to do with this case and are not helpful to 
this Court. More instructive is the Archer v. Board of State Lands and Forestry case 
wherein the lessee did have standing to challenge an easement as does HTC in the present 
case. 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). In the Archer case, a lessee of state school trust lands 
owned an access right to a pipeline easement and attempted to challenge the assignment 
of the easement. The Supreme Court of Utah determined that the lessee had standing to 
assert a challenge to an assignment of the easement affecting lessee where the assignment 
would harm lessee. Id. at 1145. 
The Archer Court cited the Jenkins Court, which sets forth the standard to 
determine standing. Specifically, 
Jenkins requires that a party seeking standing demonstrate only one of 
following: (1) a personal stake in the controversy and some causal 
relationship between the injury, the governmental actions, and the relief 
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requested; (2) that no other party has a greater interest in the outcome of the 
case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless the present party 
has standing to raise them; or (3) that the issues are of such great public 
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest. 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Utah 1983); cited in Archer v. Board of State 
Lands and Forestry, at 1145. 
In this case, the first category is easily satisfied by HTC. HTC claims, without sufficient 
underpinning, that it cannot develop the leasehold interest as contemplated without 
removing the purported easement. Therefore, HTC has a personal stake in the resolution 
of the easement issue and is bestowed standing. Further, the Ground Lease expressly 
bestows standing on HTC. HTC's argument that it does not have standing is without 
basis. 
The final case discussed by HTC is an Idaho case that again is not helpful in this 
case. In Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, the Court made the determination that 
because tenant was not the record owner of the dominant estate, it "lacks standing to seek 
to quiet title to the easement."4 152 P.3d 581, 584 (Idaho 2007). The Idaho Court made 
this determination because "Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record owner of the 
alleged dominant estate." Id. In this case, Brown is the title owner and is a party to this 
action. In addition, the Trial Court granted leave to HTC to include the owner of lot 26 in 
the present suit, if HTC desired to do so. (R. at 828). Further, the Ground Lease gives 
4
 HTC, in its brief, quoted the Idaho court as stating there was no standing "to seek a quiet 
title declaration as to existence of easement on neighbors' land, as it was not the record 
owner of the purported dominant estate." This language actually comes directly from the 
"West Headnotes" issue summary provided by Westlaw, not the court's opinion. 
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HTC the authority to clear any titles issues, which again was not the case in the Tower 
case. As a result, HTC's argument regarding standing has no merit. 
A. HTC'S ARGUMENT THAT EVEN THOUGH THE 
PURPORTED EASEMENT IS NOT RECORDED AGAINST 
LOT 27, IT IS STILL A VIOLATION OF THE GROUND 
LEASE IS UNTENABLE. 
HTC has argued that even if the purported easement is not recorded against lot 27, 
it is a breach of the Ground Lease because a "legal impossibility is [not] a defense to 
breach of a lease covenant against encumbrances," citing, Howe v. Professional Manifest 
Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 162 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). The facts of the Howe case have nothing to 
do with this case. HTC has failed to recognize the significant distinguishing facts as 
related to this case. This Ground Lease does not have a "prohibition against all 
encumbrances of any nature" like the governing documents in the Brewer and Howe 
cases. In addition, the purported easement in this case, does not encumber the Subject 
Property, was not recorded by Brown, unlike the frivolous encumbrances that constituted 
clouds on the title in Howe and Brewer. Howe, 829 P.2d at 162; Brewer v. Peatross, 595 
P.2d 866 (Utah 1979). In the Howe case, the Court determined that even though the 
Trust Deed was invalid, it was still a violation of the lease because it was recorded 
against the real property, which was prohibited by the Ground Lease. Had the Ground 
Lease in this case contained a prohibition against all encumbrances of any nature and had 
Brown recorded an easement on the Subject Property, Howe might be applicable. That 
did not happen in this case. The Howe court further determined that "[t]he Valley Bank 
29 
trust deed burdened the Howes' fee interest until it was removed from the record because 
it purported to limit their rights. Manivest breached the lease covenant against 
encumbrances, therefore, by recording the trust deed regardless of its legal effect." Id. at 
163. In this case, Brown did not authorize anything to be recorded against the real 
property like in the Howe case. Had Brown conveyed an easement to a third party, the 
Howe case might be applicable. Instead, in this case, there is no prohibition against all 
encumbrances, the purported easement has never been recorded against lot 27 and not 
only was not recorded by Brown, but was unknown to Brown. In fact, HTC itself pulled 
a title report on the Subject Property prior to the execution of the Ground Lease and the 
report did not show an easement. An easement was never recorded against lot 27, which 
further distinguishes this case from Howe. Therefore, the Howe case is distinguishable 
on all fours from the present case. 
In Brewer, the court determined that the requirement that the title be clear was 
breached because of a known lien on the real property. In fact, the real property was 
conveyed via warranty deed and the Seller represented that the S.I.D. was paid, when in 
reality it had not been paid. Specifically, "[t]he court reasoned that the property was 
encumbered because the existence of the improvements was either known to the grantors 
or was discoverable from the record by the lien filed." Brewer, 595 P.2d at 868. As 
discussed above, this purported easement has never been recorded against lot 27 and 
Brown was not aware of the purported easement at the time the Ground Lease was 
signed. Nor was HTC, as HTC acquired a title report on the Subject Property prior to the 
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execution of the Ground Lease in December of 2004. Therefore, these cases are not 
helpful to this Court and do not impose a requirement that Brown remove a nonexistent 
easement that is not recorded against lot 27. 
V. NO WARRANTY OF TITLE EXISTS REGARDING THE GROUND 
LEASE. 
In reviewing the Ground Lease, it is clear that no warranty of title exists. In fact 
Article 1.1 entitled "Demise" states 
[l]andlord hereby leases to Tenant the Premises, together with all rights, 
privileges, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in any way 
appertaining thereto, including but not limited to, any and all surface 
easements, rights, titles, and privileges of Landlord now or hereafter 
existing in and to adjacent streets, sidewalks and alleys for the Term, at the 
rental, and upon all of the covenants and conditions set forth herein. 
(R. at 13). 
HTC has been unable to point Brown or this Court to anything in the Ground Lease that 
requires clear title to the Subject Property during the leasehold. 
If HTC had exercised its option to purchase the real property, which will not now 
occur because of HTC s default, section 16 of the Ground Lease would apply to such 
exercise. In section 16.5 of the Ground Lease it provides in part that 
(b) Landlord's Estate shall be conveyed to Tenant by grant deed, bill of 
sale, general assignment and other appropriate transfer instruments, all in 
form reasonably acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord; (c) Landlord's 
Estate shall be subject to only the matters described in Section 1.1 and other 
matters reasonably approved by Tenant; (d) Landlord's Estate shall be 
conveyed using a general warranty deed . . . 
(R. at 31). 
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As discussed in Article 16.5, had HTC exercised its option, the real property 
would be conveyed via warranty deed and would be conveyed subject to the matters in 
Article 1.1 or other matters approved by Tenant. At that point, if the Tenant had not 
approved of the purported easement that is not recorded against lot 27, HTC may have 
decided not to exercise the option. However, the easement would still be exempted under 
subparagraph (e) of Article 1.1. HTC's argument that Article 16.5 helps this Court 
interpret the Ground Lease is without merit. 
After review of all the documents submitted by HTC, Mr. Moss, an attorney and a 
title expert, determined that the easement is not valid and financing would not be 
impeded by this unenforceable easement. (R. at 543). Mr. Moss also pointed out that 
based on the information attached to the Affidavit of Joseph Capilli, his office would not 
have a problem issuing a title policy without an exception clause regarding the 
unenforceable easement. (R. at 543). Indeed, Mr. Capilli's own office was once ready 
and willing to insure the title to this property. Mr. Capilli's testimony, like the rest of 
HTC's case is nothing but a ruse designed to try and justify HTC's inexcusable breach of 
the Ground Lease. 
VI. THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE GROUND LEASE. 
As explained above, there is no ambiguity in the Ground Lease. In fact, the parties 
have not pointed to a certain paragraph and had differing meanings derived therein. The 
language of the Ground Lease speaks for itself. Thus, outside evidence of intent is not 
relevant, but burdening. The parol evidence rule functions "to exclude evidence of 
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contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995). The Ground Lease provides the 
following: 
This Lease, and the Exhibits and addenda, if any, attached hereto, constitute 
the entire agreement between the parties, and there are no agreements or 
representations between the parties except as expressed herein. The recitals 
set forth above are incorporated herein and made a part of this Lease. All 
prior negotiations and agreements between Landlord and Tenant with 
respect to the subject matter hereof are superseded by this Lease. Except as 
otherwise provided herein, no subsequent change or addition to this Lease 
shall be binding unless in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
(Paragraph 22.11 -R. at 35). 
Therefore, as no assertion has been made that the Ground Lease is not lucid, all 
statements regarding intent and anticipations are not relevant in interpreting the terms of 
the Ground Lease. 
VII. EVEN IF THE PURPORTED EASEMENT EXISTS, IT IS 
ALLOWABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE GROUND 
LEASE. 
In the definition section of the Ground Lease it states, "'premises' shall mean the 
Leased Property and the Improvements now or hereafter located thereon." (R. at 3). 
Therefore, "premises" in the Ground Lease refers to the Subject Property. "'Effective 
Date' means the date first written above, which is the effective date upon which each 
party has caused to be delivered to the other party this Lease, Landlord's exclusive right 
to use the Premises has terminated and the Landlord has actually vacated the Premises." 
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(Pg. 2, Ground Lease Agreement - R. at 10). Article 1.1 of the Ground Lease provides in 
relevant part: 
Concurrently with the Effective Date, Landlord has delivered possession of 
the Premises to Tenant, subject to the following matters to the extent that 
they affect the Premises: 
(a) The Permitted Exceptions to the extent valid and subsisting and 
affecting the Premises as the Effective Date; 
(e) Present violations . . . or requirements that might be disclosed by 
an examination and inspection or search of the Premises by an> federal, 
state, county or municipal department or authority having jurisdiction, as 
the same may exist on the Effective Date. 
(R.atl3). 
HTC has argued on several occasions that because the purported easement was not 
listed on the "Permitted Exceptions" list under subsection (a), that the existence of the 
purported easement was a violation of the Ground Lease. This makes no sense based on 
paragraph (e) of the exceptions. Article 1.1 of the Ground Lease states that the Leasehold 
interest is delivered 
subject to the following matters to the extent that they affect the Premises . . 
. Present violations . . . or requirements that might be disclosed by an 
examination and inspection or search of the Premises by any federal, state, 
county or municipal department or authority having jurisdiction, as the 
same may exist on the Effective Date. 
(R.atl3). 
If the easement exists, section (e) specifically exempts the purported easement as it could 
have been discovered on the "Effective Date" by examination or inspection of county 
records. Therefore, even if the purported easement exists, it is an allowable exception 
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under the terms of the Ground Lease and as a result, all of HTC's claims fail. 
VIII. BROWN'S AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY FEES COMPLIES WITH 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS COURT'S RULING. 
HTC inaccurately argues that Brown is entitled to only a portion of its attorney fees. 
As the Trial Court correctly found, 
With respect to bringing] the lawsuit, I'm going to dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit 
and I'm also going to dismiss the counterclaims, except for the attorney's fees 
which I am going to grant to defendants in this case because they have prevailed on 
the major issue, which is in respect to the easement. 
(R. at 928, pg. 63). 
This ruling is also supported by the attorney fees clause in the Ground Lease which reads 
"[i]n any proceeding or controversy associated with or arising out of this Lease or claimed 
or actual breach hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other 
party as a part of the prevailing party's costs, such party's actual and reasonable attorneys' 
fees and court costs." (R. at 33). The lower court clearly ruled that Brown was the 
prevailing party and thus entitled to all attorney fees and costs associated with the 
controversy. Further, while the court found that HTC's conduct in regularly and 
intentionally withholding rent past the due date under the Ground Lease was not sufficient 
grounds to evict HTC, the Trial Court did find that such conduct was not acceptable 
conduct. Specifically, the Trial Court stated the following: "I don't find that the lack, or 
the gamesmanship that was played by the plaintiff to be acceptable conduct . . . If it was 
indeed to put pressure on the landlord, I think it is an unsuccessful way in engaging in 
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some self help that parties just ought not to do." (R. at 928, pg. 63). Case law also 
supports the award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party. Crowley v. Blake, 
2007 UT App. 245 f 13, 167 P.3d 1087, 1090 ("In certain circumstances, a court may 
easily determine which party is the prevailing party. For example, . . . 'if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed.'"), quoting 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, [^23, 40 P.3d 1119. 
Although HTC cannot argue that Brown is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, 
HTC is attempting to argue that Brown did not clearly set out the amount of attorney fees 
that were due and what work was done to incur the attorney fees. HTC first argues that 
"there is no basis for the award stated in the Kimball Affidavit." A brief review of 
paragraph 4(b) provides "188.5 hours have been spent by attorneys in this firm to 
prosecute this claim to judgment, or to the stage for which attorney's fees are claimed." 
(R. at 820). 
HTC is also arguing that "BFH [Brown] has wholly failed to submit sufficient 
evidence to substantiate its claim for fees, or to allow the Trial Court to determine the 
reasonableness of the fees." (Appellant's brief, pg. 19). This assertion is incorrect. As 
paragraph 11 of the Kimball Affidavit shows, Brown has provided reasonable details as to 
the services provided in the case. In fact, the following list is provided: 
11. Attorney Services. 
a. The following services have been rendered by myself 
primarily, but also by Brennan Moss and Blake Atkin in this case: Review 
of documents pertaining to the case; Legal Research; Preparation of 10 Day 
Notice to Pay or Quit; Reviewing of Title and the Deeds and all other 
36 
Documents regarding to this Matter; Preparation of Motion to Dismiss; 
Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motions to Strike; Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Summary Judgment Motion and 
Memorandum; working on discovery issues; Motion to Strike Affidavits; 
Subpoena; Preparing for the Hearing; Conference and meetings with 
expert; hearing preparation and attendance; Reviewing the Request to 
Submit for Decision; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 
Affidavit; Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law; Preparation of 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs, discussions with opposing party 
regarding settlement, and correspondence between client and third parties; 
extensive conferences with client regarding the case; Post trial hearings and 
preparation of pleadings including orders and responses to objections. 
(R. at 841). 
This information is also provided under the heading Attorney Services, which clearly sets 
out that the services were provided by attorneys. In addition, paragraph 11 shows that the 
hours were billed at the rates of $175.00 to $200.00 per hour. HTC then argues that the 
Kimball Affidavit also fails to give any analysis as to why the factors listed show that the 
fee is reasonable. This assertion is again inaccurate. The Kimball Affidavit provides the 
following in relevant part: 
6. I am generally familiar with the billing rates charged by 
attorneys with various levels of experience and expertise in this 
community. Therefore, it is my opinion that a fair and reasonable fee in 
this matter is $39,675.50, taking into account the following factors: 
a. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly; 
b. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of 
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
c. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services; 
d. The amount involved and the results obtained; 
e. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances; 
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f. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
g. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; and 
h. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(R. at 842-843). 
Brown has submitted a sworn opinion regarding the amount of attorney fees incurred in 
the case and then told this Court that the above factors were considered in that opinion. 
Therefore, the opinion clearly sets out the necessary factors to determine a reasonable 
amount of attorney fees and costs incurred. In addition, and more importantly, HTC has 
not contradicted Brown's sworn testimony with a counter expert or any sworn testimony 
that this Court could rely on. 
HTC argues "[n]o hearing was held with regard to the Trial Court's award of fees 
and costs." (HTC's brief, pg. 19). This statement is incorrect. On May 1, 2007, the Trial 
Court held a hearing regarding the order in the case and the award of attorney fees was 
ruled on and discussed. The Trial Court made the following factual findings: 
The Court: Why was it resolved? How was it resolved? What 
caused your client to stop doing what they were doing? He says, Mr. Atkin 
says it's because we came in and we took action, legal action, either writing 
letters, making phone calls, somehow intervened and got them to change 
their conduct. 
Mr. Miller: I don't know. I'd have to ask my client Your Honor. I 
personally wasn't involved back then and I'd be speculating to represent to 
the Court any differently. 
The Court: I'm going to award fees to the extent that that 
happened and I don't know how much time was involved but you can go 
through your records and if you find that you were writing letters of 
whatever you were doing on that issue, I think I'll award fees for that. I 
won't award fees beyond that on that issue. 
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Mr. Miller: So that I'm clear, Your Honor, you're still finding that 
it is not a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing nor 
a violation of the lease but fees will be awarded to the extent you've just 
outlined? 
The Court: Yes. And the reason I'm doing that is because I think 
the conduct was unacceptable under the lease and he had to come in to get 
them to stop and so they stopped it. I didn't find because they had stopped 
it, because he'd been accepting the payments and so forth and as time went 
on, I didn't find it as a violation but I found it as unacceptable conduct that 
was required. I don't know how much time it took you to do that though. 
(R. at 928, pgs. 81-82). 
After the hearing on May 1, 2007, Brown submitted the following supplemental 
affidavit of attorney fees which in part states: 
2. At a hearing before this Court on May 1, 2007, this Court reaffirmed 
its previous order awarding attorney fees to Defendant as the prevailing 
party in this case and as a result, this affidavit is submitted to this Court. 
3. Specifically, this Court determined as to Plaintiffs claims, 
Defendant is entitled to attorney fees and costs. 
4. As to the claims asserted by Defendant, Defendant is entitled to 
attorney fees incurred until Plaintiff started paying rent on the first of the 
month as provided in the Lease Agreement. 
5. This suit was initiated on August 9, 2006. 
6. On approximately September 18, 2006, counsel for Defendant sent a 
letter requiring that the rent be paid on the first of the month as required by 
the Lease Agreement. (See attached Exhibit A). 
7. As a result of the September 18, 2006, letter, Plaintiff began paying 
rent on the first of the month starting in October of 2006. 
8. After October of 2006, counsel for Defendant drafted a 
Counterclaim, filed a motion to set the amount of the possession bond and 
drafted a response to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss to base on failure to 
state a claim. 
9. The attorney fees incurred to draft the Counterclaim, motion to set 
the amount of possession bond and response to Plaintiffs motion to dismiss 
have not been calculated as attorney fees awarded to Defendant. This 
determination has been made as succinctly as possible to follow this 
Court's order. In addition, Defendant has reduced some of the preparation 
time for the hearing that took place on March 12, 2007. Likely, this 
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reduction was not necessary as the preparation time that went into the 
motion to dismiss submitted by Plaintiff was minimal. 
(R. at 839-841). 
After reviewing the Supplemental Affidavit, the Trial Court correctly entered an 
award of attorney fees and costs as reduced pursuant to the May 1, 2007, hearing. 
IX. FILING THIS FRIVILOUS LAWSUIT AGAINST BROWN AND 
DELAYING RENT PAYMENTS IN BAD FAITH IS A MATERIAL 
BREACH OF THE GROUND LEASE, 
As established by prior affidavits and pleadings, shortly after HTC signed the 
Ground Lease with Brown, HTC started causing problems. In fact, instead of paying rent 
on time, HTC met with representatives of Brown and attempted to force a renegotiation 
of the Ground Lease. After Brown refused, HTC began withholding the rent in a bad 
faith manner to cause Brown financial stress. The Ground Lease requires the rent to be 
paid on the first of the month with a 15 day grace period. If the rent is not paid within the 
grace period, Brown then has to serve a 10 day notice to pay rent. This went on for 
several months until HTC attempted to apply additional pressure by filing this lawsuit. 
After Brown raised the lawsuit as a violation of the duty to act in good faith, HTC then 
began paying rent again as agreed in the Ground Lease. 
However, the September 18, 2006, letter to HTC was notice that HTC was in 
material breach of the Ground Lease because HTC filed a frivolous lawsuit against 
Brown. HTC did not dismiss the lawsuit and thereafter Brown was forced to file a 
counterclaim for breach of contract and unlawful detainer. Filing a frivolous lawsuit 
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against the landlord is a material breach of the Ground Lease. 
A material breach is defined as an action that 
constitutes so serious a breach as to justify rescission is not easily reduced 
to precise statement, but certainly a failure of performance which "defeats 
the very object of the contract" or "[is] of such prime importance that the 
contract would not have been made if default in that particular had been 
contemplated" is a material failure. 
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Willston on Contract also sets forth elements to determine whether a material breach has 
taken place. Specifically, Willston provides: 
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is 
material, the following circumstances are significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the 
benefit which he reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately 
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform will suffer forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to 
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances 
including reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform 
or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
23 Williston on Contract § 63:3 (4th ed.). 
In this case, HTC, the tenant, tried to renegotiate the Ground Lease after it was 
signed. When that failed, HTC sued Brown, the landlord, to try and force Brown to 
remove an easement that is not recorded on the Subject Property and also ceased paying 
rent until Brown demanded payment through an attorney. This unreasonable conduct 
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happened month after month requiring Brown to incur attorney fees each month to collect 
the rent. Brown gave HTC appropriate notice that the lawsuit needed to be dismissed as 
it was a material breach of the Ground Lease. HTC did not dismiss the lawsuit. After 
pleadings and argument were submitted to the Trial Court, the Trial Court determined 
that there is not a violation of the Ground Lease on Brown's part and HTC should have 
filed their own quiet title action, if they so desired as the Ground Lease allows such. The 
lower Court then allowed HTC to remain as the tenant even though HTC filed a meritless 
lawsuit against the landlord, Brown. The lawsuit brought by HTC constitutes a material 
breach of the Ground Lease. HTC has undermined the very purpose of the Ground Lease 
by making late payments and suing Brown based on a frivolous claim. The actions by 
HTC go to the very heart of the Ground Lease and undermine the income stream it was 
designed to bring. Therefore, the actions of HTC should be considered a material breach 
of the Ground Lease. 
A. HTC HAS VIOLATED THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING. 
HTC has repeatedly violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
"Under a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises that he 
will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other 
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991); cited in Mark Technologies Corp. v. 
Utah Resources International Inc., 147 P.3d 509 (Ut Ct. App. 2006). Further, the 
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Ground Lease specifically provides "each party hereto agrees to act reasonably and in 
good faith with respect to the performance and fulfillment of the terms of each and every 
covenant and condition contained in the Lease." (Ground Lease Article 22.9 - R. at 34). 
The Ground Lease provides that HTC is required to pay rent on the first of the month. 
(R. at 14). HTC is aware that Brown relies on this money being timely paid for income. 
(R. at 520). Instead of making timely payments as required, HTC intentionally withheld 
rent payments and required Brown to retain an attorney and give notice in accordance 
with the Ground Lease to make HTC make the payments as required. Had this happened 
one time, it would be a different story. However, this has taken place numerous times. 
In fact, this retaliatory conduct took place until Brown's counsel sent a letter in 
September, 2006, stating that such conduct was a violation of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. HTC even admits that rent was intentionally withheld as retribution. 
(R. at 409). HTC's actions clearly breached the duty to act in a good faith manner. 
X. AS HTC REFUSED TO DISMISS THE LAWSUIT AGAINST 
BROWN WITHIN 30 DAYS, HTC IS IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND MUST BE EXCLUDED. 
Brown served proper notice on HTC requesting that HTC stop withholding rent 
payments and dismiss the lawsuit. (R. at 393-398 and 847-848). The September 18, 
2006, letter provided the following in relevant part: 
As you are aware, our office represents Brown Family Holdings, 
L.C. In March of 2005, Holladay Towne Center, LLC entered into a 
Ground Lease with Brown Family Holdings, L.C. At this time, Holladay is 
in default of the Ground Lease. First, for the past several months, Holladay 
has been withholding rent until near the end of each month which is 
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contrary to the requirement in the Ground Lease that rent be paid on the 
first day of each month. It appears that your client is playing games, which 
is contrary to paragraph 22.9. Paragraph 22.9 provides that "[ejxcept where 
a party hereto is specifically permitted to act in its sole and absolute 
discretion, each party hereto agrees to act reasonably and in good faith with 
respect to the performance and fulfillment of the terms of each and every 
covenant and condition contained in this Lease." Therefore, Brown Family 
Holdings, demands that you immediately start paying rent on time, on the 
first of each month, as you are in breach of paragraph 22.9. 
In addition, your client has filed suit against Brown Family 
Holdings, which is a material breach of the Ground Lease. Brown Family 
Holdings demands that you immediately dismiss your suit as it has no basis 
in law and is contrary to the terms of the Ground Lease. 
The above breaches of the Ground Lease must be cured within 
30 days or Brown Family Holdings will be forced to pursue an action 
under the unlawful detainer statute and seek an award of attorney fees 
and costs as a result of your client's actions. 
This letter is formal notice under paragraph 12.1(c) of the Ground 
Lease. 
(R. at 847-848)(Emphasis in original). 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-36-3(1) provides in relevant part: 
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer: 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held . . . after notice in writing 
requiring in the alternative the performance of the conditions or covenant. . 
As the undisputed facts show, HTC did not comply with the September 18, 2006, 
notice to dismiss the lawsuit. Therefore, after the thirty day notice expired, HTC was in 
unlawful detainer of the Subject Property and continues to be at this time. HTC should 
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be excluded from the Subject Property pursuant to the unlawful detainer statute. 
XL BROWN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED RELATING TO BROWN'S COUNTERCLAIMS5 AND 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
The Ground Lease between the parties provides 
[i]n any proceeding or controversy associated with or arising out of this Ground 
Lease or claimed or actual breach hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover from the other party as a part of the prevailing party's costs, such party's 
actual and reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(R. at 33). 
As Brown is the prevailing party in this case and likely will be on this appeal, Brown is 
entitled to attorney fees and costs. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Brown, who is seeking an award of attorney fees on appeal, is 
required to "state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." 
Therefore, pursuant to the Ground Lease between the parties, Brown as the prevailing 
party, requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred on the appeal. Further, Brown 
requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred relating to Brown's counterclaims, 
if this honorable Court determines that HTC's actions constitute a material breach of the 
Ground Lease. 
CONCLUSION 
Brown requests that this Court uphold the District Court's order to dismiss HTC's 
complaint and award attorney fees to Brown as the prevailing party. Brown also requests 
5
 The Trial Court limited the amount of attorney fees that Brown could collect relating to 
the Counterclaims asserted by Brown. 
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that this Court correct the Lower's Courts erroneous legal conclusion that the intentional 
and repeated failure to pay rent in a timely manner and the filing of a frivolous lawsuit 
was not a material breach of the Ground Lease and order the Ground Lease forfeit and 
return possession of the Subject Property to Brown and award attorney fees and costs to 
Brown pursuant to the Ground Lease. 
ADDENDUM 
The attached Addendum contains the following: "A" Ground Lease; "B" March 
12, 2007 Oral Ruling; "C" Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; "D" 
Judgment; "E" Order Re: Award of Attorney Fees and Costs; "F" May 1, 2007 Hearing 
Transcript. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and DATED this ^ - day of February, 2008. 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
Blake S. Atkin 
William O. Kimball 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
c4-I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /sU day of February, 2008,1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, L.C. upon each of the following individuals by 
causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Paxton R. Guymon 
James W. Anderson 
Joel T. Zenger 
Miller Guymon, P.C. 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 








THIS GROUND LEASE (this "Lease"), dated as of March 1, 2005 (the 
"Effective Date"), is made by and between the BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, , L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company ("Landlord"), and HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company ("Tenant"), with respect to the following facts: 
RECITALS 
A. Landlord is the fee owner of that certain real property situated in the City 
of Holladay, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which real property is legally described on Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto, together with all rights and interest, if any, of Landlord in and to the land 
lying m the streets and roads in front thereof and adjoining thereto and in and to any easements 01 
other lights appurtenant thereto (the "Landlord Property" or "Land"). 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, and the 
^presentations, warranties, covenants and conditions contained herein and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, Landlord 
and Tenant agree as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in this Lease, the following capitalized terms shall have the meanings set 
forth below: 
"Affiliate" means any Person which (1) directly or indirectly through one or more 
intermedial les controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the Tenant or 
Landloid oi (2) owns twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the equity interest of which is held 
beneficially oi of lecord by the Tenant or Landlord, as the context may require. "Contror1 means 
the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to cause the direction of the management and 
policies of a Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, family 
lelationship or otherwise. 
"Anniversary Date" means the date exactly one (1) year after the date on which 
an event occuned in a previous calendar year. 
"CPI" means the increase in the Consumer Price Index from the same date in the 
preceding year 
"Commencement Date" is the first day of the first full month beginning aftei the 
Effective Date 
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"Default Rate" means two percentage points in excess of the "Prime Rate". The 
interest rate ascertained as the Default Rate under this Agreement shall change as often as, and 
when, the Prime Rate changes or changes in the law occur, as the case may be. 
"Effective Date" means the date first written above, which is the effective date 
upon which each party has caused to be delivered to the other party this Lease, Landlord's 
exclusive right to use the Premises has terminated and the Landlord has actually vacated the 
Premises. 
"Hazardous Substances" means any hazardous or toxic substances, materials or 
wastes, including, but not limited to, those substances, materials, and wastes listed in the United 
States Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Table (49 CFR 172.101) or by the 
Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302); Hazardous 
Chemicals as defined in the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard; Hazardous Substances as 
defined in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601, et. seg.; Hazardous Substances as defined in the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 26012671; and all substances now or hereafter designated as "hazardous substances," 
"hazardous materials" or "toxic substances" under any other federal, state or local laws or in any 
regulations adopted and publications promulgated pursuant to said laws, and amendments to all 
such laws and regulations thereto, or such substances, materials, and wastes which are or become 
regulated under any applicable local, state or federal law. 
"Imposition" means all taxes (including possessory interest, real property, ad 
valorem, and personal property taxes), assessments, charges, license fees, municipal liens, levies, 
excise taxes, impact fees, or imposts, whether general or special, ordinary or extraordinary 
imposed by any governmental or quasi-governmental authority pursuant to law directly as a result 
of Tenant's leasehold ownership of the Premises or ownership of the Improvements located 
thereon which may be levied, assessed, charged or imposed, or may be or become a lien or 
charge upon the Premises, or any part thereof, or upon the leasehold estate hereby created. 
"Improvements" means any structures hereafter constructed on and affixed to the 
Land. 
"Indebtedness" means the amount which is outstanding at any given time under a 
Permitted Mortgage. 
"Indemnified Parties" means either the Landlord Indemnified Parties or the 
Tenant Indemnified Parties, as applicable; an "Indemnified Party" means any individual within 
either such group, as applicable. 
"Insurance Proceeds" means any amount received by Tenant from an insurance 
carrier, after deducting therefrom the reasonable fees and expenses of collection, including but 
not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees and experts' fees. 
"Landlord's Estate" means all of Landlord's right, title, and interest in its fee 
estate in the Premises, its reversionary interest in the Improvements pursuant hereto, and all other 
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Rent and benefits due Landlord hereunder. 
"Lease Expiration Date" means the earlier to occur of the following dates: 
(a) that date which is twenty (20) years following the Commencement Date or (b) that date upon 
which this Lease is sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions of this Lease or the mutual 
agreement of the parties hereto. 
"Leased Property" means the Landlord Property that is leased by the Tenant as 
legally described in the attached Exhibit "A". 
"Legal Requirements" means all present and future laws, statutes, requirements, 
ordinances, orders, judgments, regulations, administrative or judicial determinations, even if 
unforeseen or extraordinary, of every governmental or quasi-governmental authority, court or 
agency claiming jurisdiction over the Premises now or hereafter enacted or in effect (including, 
but not limited to, Environmental Laws and those relating to accessibility to, usability by, and 
discrimination against, disabled individuals), and all covenants, restrictions, and conditions now 
or hereafter of record which may be applicable to Tenant or to all or any portion of the Premises, 
or to the use, occupancy, possession, operation, maintenance, alteration, repair or restoration of 
any of the Premises, even if compliance therewith necessitates structural changes to the 
Improvements or the making of Improvements, or results in interference with the use or 
enjoyment of all or any portion of the Premises. 
"Mortgagee" means any one or more holders of the beneficial interest and 
secured position under any Permitted Mortgage. 
"Official Records" means the Official Records of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
"Partial Taking" is defined in Section 11.2. 
"Permitted Exceptions" means those matters described in Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto affecting Landlord's title to the Land all of which have been approved by Tenant. 
"Permitted Mortgage" means collectively (a) any deed(s) of trust and other 
collateral security instruments (including, without limitation, financing statements, security 
agreements and other documentation required pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
and any absolute or conditional assignments of rents and subleases) serving as security for one or 
more construction loans and/or permanent loans (otherwise permitted to be incurred hereunder) 
which encumber Tenant's Estate, together with any modification, substitution, amendment, 
extension, increase, refinancing, replacement or recasting (otherwise permitted to be incurred 
hereunder) thereof and (b) any instruments required in connection |vith an assignment-
subleaseback transaction involving Tenant's Estate; provided, however, in no event shall any 
such Permitted Mortgage encumber Landlord's Estate. 
"Premises" shall mean the Leased Property and the Improvements now or 
hereafter located thereon. 
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"Prime Rate" means the Key Bank Reference Rate as announced from time to 
time, or if there is no Key Bank Reference Rate, then the Prime Rate shall be the prime rate 
annoanced from time to time by the banking institution in the State of Utah having the greatest 
dollar volume of deposits. 
"Purchase Option" is defined in Article 16. 
"Rent" means all sums due and payable to Landlord by Tenant hereunder. 
"Sublease" means any present or future ground sublease, space sublease, use, or 
occupancy agreement, entered into in accordance with Article 14 below, and any modification, 
extension or termination of any of the foregoing entered into in accordance with Article 14 
below. Subleases shall also include any ground lease, space lease, use or occupancy agreement 
between Tenant, as lessor thereunder, and a lessee, the demised premises under which are 
partially situated within the Premises and partially situated within other portions of Tenant's 
Project. 
"Subtenant" means any person or entity entitled to the use of all or any portion of 
the Premises under any Sublease. Subtenants shall also include each lessee under any ground 
lease, space lease, use or occupancy agreement between Tenant, as lessor thereunder, and such 
lessee, the demised premises under which are partially situated within the Premises and partially 
situated within other portions of Tenant's Project. 
"Tenant's Estate" means all of Tenant's right, title and interest in its leasehold 
estate in the Premises, its fee estate in the Improvements, and its interest under this Lease. 
"Tenant's Project" means the Leased Property and any adjacent land and 
improvements owned or controlled by Tenant. 
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ARTICLE 1: DEMISE OF PREMISES 
1.1 Demise. Landlord hereby leases to Tenant the Premises, together with all 
rights, privileges, easements, and appurtenances belonging to or in any way appertaining thereto, 
including but not limited to, any and all surface easements, rights, titles, and privileges of 
Landlord now or hereafter existing in and to adjacent streets, sidewalks and alleys for the Term, 
at the rental, and upon all of the covenants and conditions set forth herein. 
Concurrently with the Effective Date, Landlord has delivered possession of the 
Premises to Tenant, subject to the following matters to the extent that they affect the Premises: 
(a) The Permitted Exceptions to the extent valid and subsisting and affecting the 
Premises as of the Effective Date; 
(b) The effect of all present building restrictions and regulations and present and 
future zoning laws, ordinances, resolutions, and regulations of the City of Sandy (the "City") 
which are of general application in the City and the County of Salt Lake and all present 
ordinances, regulations and orders of all boards, bureaus, commissions and bodies of the City 
(which are of general application in the City) and any county, state or federal agency, now 
having, or hereafter having acquired, jurisdiction of the Premises and the use and improvement 
thereof; 
(c) The condition and state of repair of the Premises on the Effective Date; 
(d) All taxes, duties, assessments, special assessments, water charges and sewer 
rents, and any other Impositions, accrued or unaccrued, fixed or not fixed, prorated as hereinafter 
more fully provided; and 
(e) Present violations of law, ordinances, orders or requirements that might be 
disclosed by an examination and inspection or search of the Premises by any federal, state, 
county or municipal department or authority having jurisdiction, as the same may exist on the 
Effective Date. 
1.2 Memorandum of Lease. This Lease shall not be recorded; however, to 
establish the status of Tenant's title, to establish the priority of this Lease as a condition of title, 
Landlord and Tenant agree to execute and acknowledge a short form Memorandum of this Lease 
which Tenant may record in the Official Records on or after the Effective Date. In the event of a 
discrepancy between the provisions of such Memorandum and this Lease, the provisions of this 
Lease shall prevail. Recordation of such Memoranda shall be at the expense of Tenant. 
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ARTICLE 2: TERM 
2.1 Term. The term of this Lease shall commence on the Commencement 
Date and shall expire on the date which is (20) years after the Commencement Date, unless 
sooner terminated . 
ARTICLE 3: RENT. 
3.1 Payment of Rent. Tenant shall pay Rent during the term of this Ground 
Lease to Landlord as follows: 
(a) Annual Rent. As annual rent ("Annual Rent") the sum of $58,200.00, payable 
in advance in equal monthly installments of $4,850.00 beginning on the first day of the calendar 
month after the Commencement Date and thereafter on he first day of each calendar month and is 
subject to adjustment as provided in subsection (b) below. This is a triple net lease, tenant 
agrees that the amount of annual rent will be paid without offset and that tenant will pay all 
impositions and costs relating to the property so that the Landlord has no cost or expense relating 
to the property during the term or any extension of the lease. 
(b) Adjustment to Annual Rent. On the sixth (6th) anniversary of the 
Commencement Date, the Annual Rent shall be increased to $64,200.00 payable in monthly 
installments of $5,350.00. On the eleventh (11th) anniversary of the Commencement Date, the 
Annual Rent shall be increased to $70,800.00 payable in monthly installments of $5,900.00. On 
the sixteenth (16th) anniversary of the commencement Date, the Annual Rent shall be increased 
to $78,060.00 payable in monthly installments of $6,505.00.. 
3.2 Manner of Payment. Rent to be paid to Landlord shall be paid in legal 
tender for the payment of public and private debts to Landlord at such address as Landlord may 
from time to time designate in writing. For any period of less than a full month, quarter or year 
for which Rent is payable, the applicable Rent shall be prorated. 
ARTICLE 4: PAYMENT OF TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES 
4.1 Payment of Impositions. Commencing on the Effective Date and 
continuing for the entire Initial Term and the Primary Term (collectively, the "Term") of this 
Lease and any extension thereof, Tenant covenants and agrees (except as specifically otherwise 
provided in Sections 4.2 and 4 4 below) to pay and discharge or cause to be paid and discharged 
all Impositions promptly before delinquency and before any fine, interest or penalty shall be 
assessed by reason of its nonpayment. If, at any time during the Term or any extension thereof 
the methods of taxation prevailing at the Effective Date shall be so altered so that in lieu of any 
Imposition described in this Section 4.1 there shall be levied, assessed or imposed an alternate 
tax, however designated, such alternate tax shall be deemed an Imposition for the purpose of this 
Article and Tenant shall pay and discharge such Imposition as provided by this Article. If the 
Effective Date is a day other than the first day of a "tax" or "fiscal" year, i.e., July 1 (a "Tax 
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Year'), all such Impositions shall be proiated such that Tenant shall be lesponsible only for 
those Impositions payable in connection with the Premises following the Effective Date, such 
pio lation to be based on the ratio that the number of days in such fractional Tax Yeai bears to 
365 Payment of Impositions with respect to the final Tax Yeai within the Teim shall be 
similaily pioiated Notwithstanding the foregoing, if pnoi to the Effective Date 01 aftei the 
expnation 01 eaihei teimination of this Lease, any Imposition is not payable with lespect to the 
Piemises because Tenant is exempt under applicable law fiom paying such Imposition, then such 
Imposition shall not be pioiated, and Tenant shall be lesponsible fbi 100% of such Imposition 
attnbutable to the penod following the Effective Date 01 pnoi to the expnation oi eaihei 
tei mination of this Lease, as the case may be 
4 2 Contesting Impositions In the event that Tenant shall desne to contest oi 
othei wise leview by appiopnate legal oi admimstiative pioceeding any Imposition, Tenant shall 
give Landloid wntten notice of its intention to so contest same, aftei giving such notice to 
Landloid, Tenant shall not be in default heieundei by leason of the non-payment of such 
Imposition if Tenant shall have (a) obtained and furnished to the applicable taxing authority 
(othei than Landloid) a bond oi othei security to the extent lequned by applicable law, and (b) 
established leseives leasonably sufficient to pay such contested Imposition and the penalties and 
inteiest that may be leasonably payable in connection theiewith Any such contest oi othei 
pioceeding shall be conducted solely at Tenant's expense and fiee of expense toLandlord 
Tenant shall pay the amount so deteimined to be due, togethei with all costs, expenses, inteiest, 
and penalties I elated thereto 
4 3 Utilities All water, gas, electncity, oi othei public utilities used upon oi 
furnished to the Piemises dunng the Teim heieof shall be piomptly paid by Tenant as billed and 
pi 101 to delinquency 
4 4 Payment by Landlord Unless Tenant is contesting any Impositions as 
piovided in Section 4 2 above, Landloid may, at any time after the date any Imposition is 
delinquent, give wntten notice to Tenant specifying same, and if Tenant continues to fail to pay 
oi contest such Imposition, then at any time after ten (10) days fiom Tenant's receipt of such 
wntten notice, Landloid may pay the Imposition specified in said notice Tenant covenants to 
leimbuise and pay Landloid any amount so paid oi expended in the payment of such Imposition 
upon demand theiefoi, with interest theieon at the Default Rate fiom the date of such payment by 
Landloid until lepaid byTenant 
ARTICLE 5: ENCUMBRANCE OF TENANT'S ESTATE; MORTGAGEE 
PROTECTION 
5 1 Encumbiance of Tenant's Estate Tenant shall have the light to encumbei 
Tenants Estate oi any poition theieof or inteiest theiein oi any Sublease puisuant to one oi moie 
Peimitted Moitgages, piovided Tenant shall lefiain fiom encumbeimg oi puipoiting to 
encumbei, by means of a Peimitted Mortgage oi othei wise any portion of the Landloid Piopeity 
othei than Tenant's inteiest in easements and covenants Tenant shall, piomptly following its 
leceipt of any notice of default oi othei notice of the acceleiation of the matunty of a Peimitted 
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Mortgage from a Mortgagee, deliver a true and correct copy thereof to Landlord. 
5.2 Mortgagee Protections. Provided that any Mortgagee provides Landlord 
with a conformed copy of each Permitted Mortgage which contains the name and address of such 
Mortgagee, and provided such Permitted Mortgage was executed in compliance with the terms 
hereof, Landlord hereby covenants and agrees to faithfully perform and comply with the 
following provisions with respect to such Permitted Mortgage: 
(a) No Termination. No action by Tenant or Landlord to cancel, surrender, or 
materially modify the terms of this Lease or the provisions of this Article 5 shall be binding upon 
a Mortgagee without its prior written consent. 
(b) Notices. If Landlord shall give any notice, demand, election or other 
communication which may adversely affect the security for a Permitted Mortgage, including 
without limitation a notice of an Event of Default hereunder (hereinafter collectively "Notices") 
to Tenant, Landlord shall simultaneously give a copy of each such Notice to the Mortgagee at the 
address theretofore designated by it. Such copies of Notices shall be sent by Landlord and 
deemed received as described in Article 17 below. No Notice given by Landlord to Tenant shall 
be binding upon or affect said Mortgagee unless a copy of said Notice shall be given to 
Mortgagee pursuant to this Section. In the case of an assignment of such Permitted Mortgage or 
change in address of such Mortgagee, said assignee or Mortgagee, by written notice to Landlord, 
may change the address to which such copies of Notices are to be sent. Landlord shall not be 
bound to recognize any assignment of such Permitted Mortgage unless and until Landlord shall 
be given written notice thereof, a copy of the executed assignment, and the name and address of 
the assignee. Thereafter, such assignee shall be deemed to be the Mortgagee hereunder with 
respect to the Permitted Mortgage being assigned. 
(c) Performance of Covenants. The Mortgagee shall have the right to perform 
any term, covenant or condition and to remedy any default by Tenant hereunder within the time 
periods specified herein, and Landlord shall accept such performance with the same force and 
effect as if furnished by Tenant; provided, however, that said Mortgagee shall not thereby or 
hereby be subrogated to the rights of Landlord. 
(d) Delegation to Mortgagee. Tenant may delegate irrevocably to the Mortgagee 
the non-exclusive authority to exercise any or all of Tenant's rights hereunder, but no such 
delegation shall be binding upon Landlord unless and until either Tenant or the Mortgagee shall 
give to Landlord a true copy of a written instrument effecting such delegation. Such delegation 
of authority may be effected by the terms of the Permitted Mortgage itself, in which case service 
upon Landlord of an executed counterpart or conformed copy of said Permitted Mortgage in 
accordance with this Article 5, together with written notice specifying the provisions therein 
which delegate such authority to said Mortgagee, shall be sufficient to give Landlord notice of 
such delegation. 
(e) Default by Tenant. In the event of an Event of Default by Tenant in the 
payment of any monetary obligation hereunder, Landlord agrees not to terminate this Lease 
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unless and until Landlord provides written notice of such Event of Default to any Mortgagee and 
such Mortgagee shall have failed to cure such Event of Default within thirty (30) business days 
following delivery of such notice. In the event of an Event of Default by Tenant in the 
performance or observance of any non-monetary term, covenant, or condition to be performed by 
it hereunder, Landlord agrees not to terminate this Lease unless and until Landlord provides 
written notice of such Event of Default to any Mortgagee and such Mortgagee shall have failed to 
cure such Event of Default within thirty (30)days following the expiration of any grace or cure 
periods granted Tenant herein; provided, however, if such Event of Default cannot practicably be 
cured by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, or if such Event of Default is 
not susceptible of being cured by the Mortgagee, then Landlord shall not terminate this Lease if 
and as long as: 
(i) In the case of an Event of Default which cannot practicably be 
cured by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, the Mortgagee has delivered 
to Landlord, prior to the date on which Landlord shall be entitled to give notice of lease 
termination, a written undertaking wherein the Mortgagee agrees that it will cure such Event of 
Default; 
(ii) In the case of an Event of Default which cannot practicably be 
cured by the Mortgagee without taking possession of the Premises, said Mortgagee shall proceed 
diligently to obtain possession of the Premises as Mortgagee (including possession by receiver), 
and, upon obtaining such possession, shall proceed diligently to cure such Event of Default in 
accordance with the undertaking delivered pursuant to Subsection (i) above but in no event later 
than 180 days after obtaining possession; and 
(iii) In the case of an Event of Default which is not susceptible to being 
cured by the Mortgagee (for example, the insolvency of Tenant), the Mortgagee shall institute 
foreclosure proceedings and diligently prosecute the same to completion (unless in the meantime 
it shall acquire Tenant's Estate hereunder, either in its own name or through a nominee, by 
assignment in lieu of foreclosure) and, upon such completion of foreclosure or acquisition, such 
Event of Default shall be deemed to have been cured. 
The Mortgagee shall not be required to obtain possession or to continue in possession as 
Mortgagee of the Premises pursuant to Subsection (ii) above, or to continue to prosecute 
foreclosure proceedings pursuant to Subsection (iii) above, if and when such Event of Default 
shall be cured. Nothing herein shall preclude Landlord from exercising any of its rights or 
remedies with respect to any other Event of Default by Tenant during any period of such 
forbearance, but in such event the Mortgagee shall have all of its rights provided for herein. If 
the Mortgagee, its nominee, or a purchaser in a foreclosure sale, shall acquire title to Tenant's 
Estate hereunder and shall cure all Events of Default which are susceptible of being cured by the 
Mortgagee or by said purchaser, as the case may be, then prior Events of Default which are not 
susceptible to being cured by the Mortgagee or by said purchaser shall no longer be deemed 
Events of Default hereunder. 
(f) Foreclosure. Foreclosure of any Permitted Mortgage, or any sale thereunder, 
whether by judicial proceedings or by virtue of any power contained in the Permitted Mortgage, 
or any conveyance of the leasehold estate hereunder from Tenant to any Mortgagee or its 
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designee through, or in lieu of, foreclosure or other appropriate proceedings in the nature thereof, 
shall not require the consent of Landlord or constitute a breach of any provision of or a default 
under this Lease, and upon such foreclosure, sale or conveyance Landlord shall recognize the 
Mortgagee or such designee as the Tenant hereunder. If any Mortgagee or other third party shall 
acquire Tenant's Estate as a result of a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure under any Permitted 
Mortgage, or by means of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or through settlement of or arising out of 
any pending or contemplated foreclosure action, such Mortgagee or such other third party 
purchaser shall thereafter have the right to further assign or transfer Tenant's Estate to an 
assignee upon obtaining Landlord's consent with respect thereto, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed, and subject to all of the other provisions of Article 15 below. 
Upon such acquisition of Tenant's Estate as described in the preceding sentence by Mortgagee or 
its designee, Landlord shall immediately execute and deliver a new ground lease of the Premises 
to such Mortgagee, upon the written request therefor by such Mortgagee given not later than one 
hundred twenty (120) days after such party's acquisition of the Tenant's Estate. Such new ground 
lease shall be substantially similar in form and content to the provisions of this Lease, except 
with respect to the parties thereto, the term thereof (which shall be co-extensive with the 
remaining term hereof), and the elimination of any requirements which have been fulfilled by 
Tenant prior thereto, and such new ground lease shall have priority equal to the priority of this 
Lease. Upon execution and delivery of such new ground lease, Landlord shall cooperate with the 
new Tenant, at the sole expense of said new Tenant, in taking such action as may be necessary to 
cancel and discharge this Lease and to remove Tenant named herein from the Premises. 
(g) Mortgagee Loss Payable. Landlord agrees that the names of each Mortgagee 
shall be added to the "Loss Payable Endorsement" of any and all insurance policies required to be 
earned by Tenant under this Lease on condition that the insurance proceeds are to be applied in 
the manner specified herein. 
(h) New Lease. Landlord agrees that in the event of termination of this Lease by 
reason of any Event of Default by Tenant, or by reason of the disaffirmance hereof by a receiver, 
liquidator or trustee for Tenant or its property, Landlord will enter into a new lease of the 
Premises with the most senior Mortgagee requesting a new lease for the remainder of the Lease 
Term, effective as of the date of such termination, at the rent, and upon the terms, provisions, 
covenants and agreements as herein contained and subject to the rights, if any, of any parties then 
in possession of any part of the Premises, provided: 
(i) Mortgagee agrees to pay Landlord's reasonable attorney fees in 
connection with such new lease. 
(i) The senior Mortgagee shall make written request upon Landlord 
for the new lease within sixty (60) days after the date of termination: 
(ii) The senior Mortgagee shall pay to Landlord at the time of the 
execution and delivery of the new lease any and all sums which would, at the time of the 
execution and delivery thereof, be due and unpaid pursuant to this Lease but for its termination, 
and in addition thereto any expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to which Landlord 
shall have been subjected by reason of the Event of Default; 
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(iii) The senior Mortgagee shall perform and observe all covenants 
herein contained on Tenant's part to be performed which are susceptible to being performed by 
the senior Mortgagee, and shall further remedy any other conditions which Tenant under the 
terminated Lease was obligated to perform under its terms, to the extent the same are curable or 
may be performed by the senior Mortgagee; and 
(iv) The tenant under the new lease shall have the same right, title and 
interest in and to all improvements located on the Premises as Tenant had under the terminated 
Lease immediately prior to its termination. 
(v) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary expressed or implied 
elsewhere in this Lease, any new lease made pursuant to this Section 5.2 (h), shall be prior to any 
Permitted Mortgage or other lien, charge or encumbrance on the Premises, to the same extent as 
the terminated Lease, and shall be accompanied by a conveyance of title to the existing 
improvements (free of any mortgage, deed of trust, lien, charge, or encumbrance created by 
Landlord) for a term of years equal to the term of the new lease, subject to the reversion in favor 
of Landlord upon expiration or sooner termination of the new lease. The rights granted any 
Mortgagee to a new lease shall survive any termination of this Le^se. 
(vi) If a Mortgagee shall elect to demand a new lease under this 
Section 5.2(h), Landlord agrees, at the request of, on behalf of and at the sole cost and expense of 
the Mortgagee, to institute and pursue diligently to conclusion any appropriate legal remedy or 
remedies to oust or remove the original Tenant from the Premises, and those Subtenants actually 
occupying the Premises, or any part thereof, as designated by the Mortgagee subject to any non-
disturbance or attornment agreements with such Subtenants. Such Mortgagee shall indemnify, 
defend and hold harmless Landlord for any losses, claims, costs and expenses (including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) arising out of Landlord's compliance with the provisions of 
this subparagraph (vi). 
(vii) Unless and until Landlord has received notice from all Mortgagees 
that the Mortgagees elect not to demand a new lease as provided in Section 5.2(h), or until the 
period therefore has expired, Landlord shall not cancel or agree to the termination or surrender of 
any existing Subleases nor enter into any new subleases hereunder without the prior written 
consent of the Mortgagee. 
(i) No Obligation to Cure. Nothing herein contained shall require any Mortgagee 
to enter into a new lease pursuant to Section 5.2(h) above, or to cure any default of Tenant 
referred to above. 
(j) No Personal Liability. In the event any Mortgagee or its designee becomes the 
Tenant under this Lease or under any new lease obtained pursuant to either Section 5.2(f) or 
5.2(h) above, the Mortgagee or its designee shall be personally liable for the obligations of 
Tenant under this Lease or a new lease, (k) Insurance Proceeds. The proceeds from any 
insurance policies or arising from a condemnation shall be paid to and held by the senior 
Mortgagee and distributed pursuant to the provisions of this Lease. 
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(1) Material Notices The paities hereto shall give all Moitgagees notice of any 
aibitiation, litigation, or condemnation pioceedmgs, or of any pending adjustment of msuiance 
claims as each may relate to the Premises, and any Mortgagee shall have the light to intervene 
theiem and shall be made a paity to such pioceedmgs The parties heieto do heieby consent to 
such inteivention In the event that any Moitgagee shall not elect to inteivene 01 become a paity 
to the pioceedmgs, such Moitgagee shall leceive notice and a copy of any awaid 01 decision 
made in connection theiewith 
(m)Sepaiate Agieement Landloid shall, upon lequest, execute, acknowledge and 
dehvei to each Moitgagee, an agreement piepared at the sole cost and expense of Tenant, in foim 
satisfactoiy to each Moitgagee, between Landloid, Tenant and the Mortgagees, agreeing to all of 
the piovisions heieof, piovided that Tenant shall pay Landloid5s leasonable attoiney fees foi 
leview of any such agieement 
(n) Fuithei Amendments Landloid heieby agiees to coopeiate with Tenant in 
including in this Lease by suitable amendment from time to time any piovision which Tenant 
may leasonably lequest as being from any pioposed Mortgagee foi the puipose of implementing 
the Moitgagee piotection piovisions contained in this Lease and allowing such Moitgagee 
leasonable means to piotect 01 pieserve the lien of the Peimitted Moitgage, as well as such othei 
documents containing teims and piovisions customarily requned by Moitgagees (taking into 
account the customaiy lequnements of their paiticipants, syndication partners 01 latings 
agencies) in connection with any such financing Landloid agrees to execute and dehvei (and to 
acknowledge, if necessaiy, foi lecoidmg purposes) any agreement necessaiy to effectuate any 
such amendment as well as such othei documents containing teims and piovisions customarily 
lequned by Lendeis in connection with any such financing, provided, howevei, that any such 
amendment shall not in any way affect the term 01 Rent undei this Lease, noi otherwise in any 
matenal lespect adveisely affect any lights of Landlord undei this Lease Tenant agrees to pay 
Landloid's leasonable attoiney fees m connection with any such amendments or documents 
ARTICLE 6: POSSESSION, USE, COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS, 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS 
6 1 Possession Tenant acknowledges that as of the Effective Date it shall 
accept possession of the Land 
6 2 Use Subject to the provisions of this Aiticle 6, Tenant may use the 
Piemises foi a shopping center, retail stoie(s), office(s), oi any other puipose peimitted undei 
Utah law Tenant may constiuct all the Impiovements on the Land as pait of Tenant's Pioject 
6 3 Compliance With Laws Subject to the provisions of Aiticle 8 below, 
Tenant shall comply with all Legal Requnements in the use, occupation, contiol and enjoyment 
of the Piemises and in the piosecution and conduct of its business theieon Tenant shall have the 
light, at its own cost and expense, to contest or leview by appiopnate legal oi admmistiative 
pioceedmg the validity oi legality of any such Legal Requnement, and duung such contest 
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Tenant may lefiain fiom complying therewith provided that compliance theiewith may legally be 
held in abeyance without subjecting Landlord to any liability, civil or criminal, of whatsoevei 
natuie foi failuie so to comply therewith and without the incurrence of a lien, charge 01 liability 
against the Piemises 01 Landlord's Estate, and piovided further that all such proceedings shall be 
piosecuted by Tenant with due diligence 
6 4 Maintenance Tenant shall, during the term hereof, keep and maintain the 
Piemises in compliance with all Legal Requirements and all appmtenances thereto in good oidei 
and lepan, and shall allow no nuisance to exist 01 be maintained theiem Landloid shall not be 
obligated to make any repans, replacements, 01 renewals of any kind, natuie, 01 description 
whatsoevei to the Piemises 
ARTICLE 7: CHANGES, ALTERATIONS AND NEW CONSTRUCTION 
7 1 Generally Tenant shall have the right to altei, lepan, lestoie, leplace oi 
leconstiuct any of the Impiovements located on the Land (which right shall necessanly include 
the light to demolish any of the Impiovements), provided that all such work shall be peifoimed 
by Tenant in compliance with this Aiticle 7 
7 2 Notice of Completion Upon completion of any woik of Impiovement 
upon the Piemises, Tenant shall file oi cause to be filed, if lequned by applicable law, a valid 
Notice of Completion in a timely fashion 
7 3 Title to Impiovements All Impiovements constructed oi installed upon 
the Piemises by Tenant at any time pnoi to the Lease Expnation Date shall be and theieaftei 
lemam leal piopeity, and aie and shah be the property of Tenant, piovided, howevei, that upon 
the Lease Expnation Date, title to such Improvements shall vest in Landloid and the same shall 
become the piopeity of Landloid Notwithstanding anything to the contiaiy contained in this 
Section, Tenant heieby covenants and agiees to piomptly execute and acknowledge (at no cost oi 
expense to Tenant) a quitclaim deed oi any othei documentation reasonably requiied by Landloid 
to effectuate the piovisions of this Section, Tenant's covenant to dp so shall suivive the Lease 
Expnation Date 
ARTICLE 8: ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS 
8 1 Envnonmental Compliance Commencing on the Effective Date, Tenant 
shall at all times comply with applicable Envnonmental Laws affecting the Piemises Tenant 
shall at its own expense maintain in effect any permits, license oi othei goveinmental appiovals 
ielating to Hazaidous Substances, if any, lequned foi Tenant's use, and cause each Subtenant to 
maintain in effect any such peimits, license or othei goveinmental appiovals, if any, lequned foi 
such Subtenant s use, of the Piemises Tenant shall make all disclosuies lequned of Tenant by 
any such Envnonmental Laws, and shall comply with all oideis, with lespect to Tenant's and its 
employees', agents', contiactois' and invitees' use of the Piemises, issued by any governmental 
authonty having junsdiction ovei the Piemises and take all action jequned by such goveinmental 
authoiities to bung Tenant's and its employees', agents', contiactois' and invitees activities on the 
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Premises into compliance with all Environmental Laws affecting the Premises. 
8.2 Notices. If at any time Tenant or Landlord shall become aware, or have 
reasonable cause to believe, that any actionable level of Hazardous Substance has been released 
or has otherwise come to be located on or beneath the Premises, such party shall immediately 
upon discovering the release or the presence or suspected presence of the Hazardous Substance, 
give written notice of that condition to the other party. In addition, the party first learning of the 
release or presence of an actionable level of Hazardous Substance on or beneath the Premises, 
shall immediately notify the other party in writing of: (i) any enforcement, cleanup, removal, or 
other governmental or regulatory action instituted, completed, or threatened pursuant to any 
Environmental Laws; (ii) any claim made or threatened by any person against Landlord, Tenant 
or the Premises arising out of or resulting from any actionable level of Hazardous Substances; 
and (iii) any reports made to any local, state, or federal environmental agency arising out of or in 
connection with any actionable level of Hazardous Substance. 
8.3 Indemnity. 
(a) By Landlord. Landlord shall indemnify, defend (by counsel acceptable to 
Tenant), protect, and hold harmless Tenant, Tenant's Affiliates and their respective partners, 
members, shareholders, trustees, beneficiaries, officers, directors, employees, attorneys, agents, 
heirs, representatives, successors and assigns ("Tenant Indemnified Parties"), from any and all 
claims, liabilities, penalties, fines, judgments, forfeitures, losses, costs, or expenses (including 
reasonable attorneys', consultants', and expert fees) (collectively, "Claims") arising from, related 
to, or in connection with the death of or injury to any person or damage to any property 
whatsoever, arising from or caused in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by the presence in, 
on, under, or about the Land, or any discharge or release in or from the Land of any Hazardous 
Substance, to the extent that any such presence, discharge, or release is caused by Landlord's 
activities or the activities of any of Landlord's employees, agents, contractors or invitees prior to 
the Effective Date. 
(b) Tenant. Tenant shall indemnify, defend (by counsel acceptable to Landlord), 
protect, and hold harmless Landlord, Landlord's Affiliates and their respective commissioners, 
directors, trustees, beneficiaries, officers, partners, member, directors, employees, attorneys, 
agents, successors and assigns ("Landlord Indemnified Parties"), from and against any and all 
Claims arising from, related to, or in connection with the death of or injury to any person or 
damage to any property whatsoever, arising from or caused in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, by (i) the presence in, on, under, or about the Premises or any discharge or release in 
or from the Premises of any Hazardous Substance, to the extent that any such presence, 
discharge, or release is caused by Tenant's activities, or the activities of any of Tenant's 
Subtenants, employees, agents, contractors or invitees, or (ii) Tenant's failure to comply with its 
covenants under Section 8.1 and occurs after the Effective Date. 
(c) Costs Included; Survival. The indemnity obligations created hereunder shall 
include, without limitation, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable, any and all costs incurred in 
connection with any site investigation, and any and all costs for repair, cleanup, detoxification or 
decontamination, or other remedial action of the Premises. The obligations of the parties 
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hereunder shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease. 
ARTICLE 9: INSURANCE 
9.1 All Risk Insurance. Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, from the Effective 
Date forward shall throughout the entire Term keep the Insured Property insured against loss or 
damage by fire, windstorm, tornado, hail, water damage, lightning, vandalism and malicious 
mischief and against loss or damage by such other, further and additional risks as now are or 
hereafter may be embraced by the standard "all risk" forms or endorsements, and any coverage 
available under the so-called "installation floater", in each case in the full amount of the 
replacement value of the Insured Property and 100% of the replacement value of the rental 
receipts of the Insured Property on an actual loss-sustained basis (the "Full Insurable Value"). 
Likewise, any new Improvements constructed on the premises shall be insured as described 
above as of the Date of Substantial Completion. For purposes of the immediately preceding 
sentence, any building or structure and the Improvements related thereto or contained therein 
shall be deemed to be substantially completed when such building or structure and its related 
Improvements, taken as a whole, are substantially completed. 
9.2 Additional Insurance. Tenant, at its sole cost and expense, shall throughout 
the entire Term procure and maintain: 
(a) Liability Insurance. Liability insurance against claims for bodily injury, death 
or property damage occurring upon, in or about the Insured Property, including the public areas 
adjacent thereto, including, in a form no less than a commercial general liability policy, 
explosion, collapse and underground coverage, such insurance to afford immediate protection at 
the Effective Date for not less than $1,000,000 per occurrence/aggregate and $1,000,000 
complete operations per occurrence/aggregate. Such insurance shall, among other things, provide 
broad form contractual liability coverage (including without limitation indemnification or hold 
harmless obligations of Tenant under this Lease) and personal injury (including without 
limitation coverage for assault and battery not committed by or at the direction of the insured). 
Such insurance for the Insured Property shall also provide so-called "cross -liability" coverage for 
all of the insureds in respect of the employees of each insured. Landlord shall be named an 
additional insured under such policy. 
9.3 Builder's Risk Insurance. During the construction of any Improvements the 
insurance required by Section 9.1 shall, as to such Improvements which are part of the Insured 
Property, be in the form commonly known as "Builder's Risk" on an "all risk" basis including 
without limitation coverage against fire, lightning, wind damage, hail and collapse and coverage 
under the so-called "installation floater". The policy shall be secured and maintained by Tenant 
in a form and amount as may from time to time be determined by Tenant. Coverage shall include 
all materials, supplies and equipment that are intended for specific installation in the Insured 
Property while such materials, supplies and equipment are located in or on the Insured Property, 
in transit and while temporarily located away from the Insured Property for the purpose of repair, 
adjustment or storage at the risk of one of the insured parties. 
9.4 Named Insureds and Insurance Trustee. All policies of insurance required 
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under Section 9.2 to be furnished under this Lease shall include as named insureds Landlord, 
Tenant, any Leasehold Mortgagee, Tenant's managers, and their respective officers, directors, 
trustees, partners, employees and agents, as their respective interests may appear. All policies of 
insurance required under Sections 9.1 and 9.3 to be furnished under this Lease shall include as 
named insureds Tenant, any Leasehold Mortgagee, Tenant's general partners, and their respective 
officers, directors, trustees, partners, employees and agents, as their respective interests may 
appear, and Landlord as an additional insured as its interest may appear. All such policies of 
insurance shall provide that the loss, if any, shall be payable to the Insurance Trustee, provided 
that payments may be made directly to the third-party claimants under liability policies. 
Promptly upon the Insurance Trustee's receipt of any payments under any such policy, the 
Insurance Trustee shall (a) reimburse Landlord, Tenant, any Leasehold Mortgagee and the 
Insurance Trustee for their reasonable expenses incurred in the collection of the insurance 
proceeds and (b) pay to Landlord, Tenant and any Leasehold Mortgagee their respective shares of 
the proceeds paid under any such policy. 
9.5 Insurance in General, (a) Each policy of insurance required under this 
Lease shall include provisions that the holder of such policy shall not cancel or terminate such 
policy, or cause such policy to expire, due to non-renewal by Tenant, and that coverages under 
such policy shall not be materially reduced, unless at least 7 days notice of such proposed 
expiration or reduction has been provided to all the insureds named in such policy by such 
holder. 
(b) To the extent allowed by Tenant's Lenders, all proceeds of such policies shall 
be used for the restoration or repair of the Insured Property. 
(c) Each policy of insurance required under this Lease shall include a provision 
for a waiver of subrogation in favor of Landlord, Tenant and all other insureds. 
9.6 Copies to Landlord. Upon the execution and delivery of this Lease and 
thereafter not less than ten days prior to the expiration date of any insurance policy delivered 
pursuant to this Article, Tenant shall deliver to Landlord certified copies (or certified extracts 
approved by Landlord) of to be furnished hereunder all policies of insurance required. Pending 
issuance of such policies, Tenant may deliver to Landlord a commitment evidencing the 
coverages required under this Lease, provided that Tenant shall replace such commitment with 
certified copies (or extracts, as permitted herein) prior to the expiration date of such commitment. 
9.7 Adjustment of Loss. Any loss under any policy of insurance required to be 
furnished under this Lease shall be adjusted solely by Tenant. 
9.8 Unearned Premiums. The unearned premiums on all insurance policies m 
force at the end of the Term which Landlord desires to keep in effect shall be reimbursed by 
Landlord to Tenant and, upon such reimbursement, Tenant shall transfer to Landlord all of 
Tenant's interest in such insurance policies, unless a New Lease is entered into by Landlord, in 
which case Tenant shall transfer to the new lessee under such New Lease all of Tenant's interest 
in such insurance policies. 
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9.9 Blanket Insurance. Nothing in this Article shall prevent Tenant from 
taking out insurance of the kind and in the amounts provided for under this Article under any 
blanket insurance policy which covers other properties owned or operated by Tenant or its 
Affiliates as well as the Insured Property, provided that any such policy of insurance (a) shall 
specify therein, or Tenant shall furnish Landlord with a written statement from the insurers under 
such policy specifying, the amount of the total insurance allocated to the Insured Property, which 
amount shall be not less than the amount required by this Article to be carried, and (b) shall not 
contain any clause which would result in the insured thereunder being required to carry insurance 
with respect to the Insured Property in an amount equal to a minimum specified percentage of the 
Full Insurable Value of such Insured Property in order to prevent the named insured therein from 
becoming a co-insurer of any loss with the insurer under such policy. Tenant shall furnish to 
Landlord, within 30 days after the filing thereof with any insurance ratemaking body, copies of 
the schedule or make-up of all property covered by any such policy of blanket insurance. 
9.10 Primary and Excess Coverages. Limits of liability for insurance required 
hereunder may be provided by primary insurance or a combination of both primary and excess 
insurance coverages. 
9.11 Insurance Non-Contributory. Neither Tenant nor Landlord shall carry 
separate insurance, concurrent in form and contributing, in the event of loss, for any insurance 
required under the provisions of this Article unless, in conformity with the requirements of this 
Article, all the named insureds listed in Section 9.4 are included therein as the named insureds. 
Tenant and Landlord shall each promptly notify of and deliver to the other each such separate 
insurance policy. 
ARTICLE 10: DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION 
10.1 Damage. If, during the Term, there occurs any material or substantial 
damage to or destruction of the Premises or any part thereof resulting from any cause whatsoever 
(except for any damage or destruction caused by Landlord, its invitees or permitees), Tenant shall 
give prompt notice thereof to Landlord and the Mortgagee, and Tenant shall take such action as 
is reasonably necessary to assure that neither the Premises nor the Improvements constitutes a 
nuisance or otherwise presents a health or safety hazard, such work to be accomplished at 
Tenant's sole cost and expense. The foregoing obligation shall not be contingent upon the 
availability of any Insurance Proceeds; however, Tenant shall be reimbursed out of the Insurance 
Proceeds for such work to the extent available. 
10.2 Cancellation. Tenant shall have the right, under any circumstance that 
would excuse the obligation of Tenant to restore the Premises, to terminate this Lease, by 
notifying Landlord within sixty (60) days after such date of damage or destruction. If the 
Premises shall be damaged so that Tenant reasonably determines that the cost would make 
restoration thereof unfeasible, notwithstanding the availability of Insurance Proceeds therefor, 
Tenant may terminate this Lease within sixty (60) days after such damage. Within 360 days after 
such termination, Tenant shall raze the then existing Improvements on the Land and clear the 
Land of debris and rubble. 
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10 3 Restoiation If this Lease is not terminated as piovided in Section 10 2 
above, Tenant shall, subject to the terms of any Permitted Mortgage, proceed with the repan oi 
lestoiation of the damaged Piemises within ninety (90) days following such damage or 
destiuction oi, if gieatei than eighty percent (80%) of the estimated cost of such lestoiation is 
coveied by insuiance, then such later date as the Insurance Proceeds aie available theiefoi, and 
once commenced such lestoiation shall be diligently piosecuted to completion Landloid agiees 
to make available to Tenant any Insuiance Pioceeds (subject to the lights of any Moitgagee) 
payable to Landloid attributable and to be used for the restoration and lepan of the Piemises as 
heiein piovided Landloid shall have no liability to Tenant, and Tenant shall not be entitled to 
teiminate this Lease by vntue of any delays in completion of lepaiis and lestoiation, except to the 
extent caused by Landloid 
10 4 Insuiance Pioceeds All Insurance Pioceeds shall be collected, held and 
disbuised in accoidance with the teims of the applicable Peimitted Moitgage All Insurance 
Pioceeds payable as a lesult of any damage or destiuction which are to be used by Tenant foi 
such lepairs and lestoiation shall be payable to Tenant and used by Tenant to the extent necessaiy 
foi payment of the cost of lepaiis and lestoiation lequned hereby Any unused pioceeds may be 
letamed by Tenant (subject to the lequirements of the applicable Peimitted Moitgage) 
ARTICLE 11: EMINENT DOMAIN 
11 1 Substantial Taking If foity peicent (40%) oi moie of the Piemises shall 
be taken foi a public oi quasi-public use by the exeicise of the power of eminent domain oi by 
puichase undei thieat of condemnation by any governmental agency, this Lease shall teiminate in 
its entiiety on the date the condemning authority actually consummates such taking of the 
Piemises, and the Rent lequned to be paid by Tenant heieundei shall be appropnately piorated 
and paid to such date of taking oi ieduced as piovided herembelow In the event of any such 
taking, Landlord and Tenant shall togethei make one claim foi an awaid foi then combined 
mteiesls in the Piemises including an awaid foi severance damages if less than the whole shall be 
so taken The Condemnation Pioceeds shall be distnbuted to Tenant (subject to the lights of the 
applicable Moitgagee undei its Permitted Moitgage) to the extent that it is attnbutable to 
Tenants Estate, oi Tenant's peisonal piopeity or the Impiovements (oi that of its invitees, agents 
oi Subtenants) and to Landloid to the extent that it is attnbutable to the Landloid's Estate 
112 Partial Taking If less than forty percent (40%) of the Piemises shall be 
taken foi any public oi quasi-public use under the powei of eminent domain oi by purchase undei 
thieat of condemnation by any goveinmental agency, or if any appurtenances of the Piemises oi 
any vaults oi aieas outside the boundanes of the Premises oi lights in, undei or above the stieets 
adjoining the Piemises oi the lights and benefits of light, air or access fiom oi to such stieets, 
shall be so taken, oi the giade of any such stieets shall be changed, in any such case in a mannei 
that the lemaining poition of the Piemises can be adapted and economically opeiated foi the 
puiposes and in substantially the same mannei as it was opeiated pnoi theieto in Tenants good 
faith business judgment, Tenant shall give prompt notice thereof to Landloid, this Lease shall 
continue in full foice and effect and Base Rent shall be equitably abated Tenant shall pioceed, 
with leasonable diligence, to peifoim any necessaiy lepairs and to lestoie the Piemises to an 
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economically viable unit in strict accoidance with all Legal Requnements and the lequnements 
of Aiticle 7 above, and as neaily as possible to the condition the Piemises was in immediately 
pi 101 to such taking The Condemnation Pioceeds shall be paid to Tenant (subject to the nghts of 
any Moitgagee) to the extent that it is attributable to Tenant's Estate, 01 Tenants peisonal 
piopeity 01 the Impiovements (oi that of its invitees, agents oi Subtenants) and to Landlord to the 
extent that it is attubutable to the Landlord's Estate 
11 3 Tempoiary Taking If the temporaly use (but not leasehold title) of the 
whole oi any pait of the Piemises shall be taken as afoiesaid for less than ten (10) days in any 
calendai yeai, this Lease shall not be affected in any way and Tenant shall continue to pay all 
Rent due heieundei All Condemnation Proceeds as a result of such tempoiaiy use shall be paid 
to Tenant 
114 Pioceedmgs In any condemnation pioceedmg affecting the Piemises 
which may affect Landloid's Estate and Tenant's Estate, both paities shall have the light to appeai 
in and defend against such action as they deem piopei in accordance with then own mteiests To 
the extent possible, the paities shall coopeiate to maximize the Condemnation Proceeds payable 
by leason of the condemnation Issues between Landlord and Tenant lequned to be lesolved 
puisuant to this Aiticle shall be joined in any such condemnation pioceedmg to the extent 
peimissible undei then applicable procedural mles of such court of law oi equity foi the puipose 
of avoiding multiplicity of actions and minimizing the expenses of the paities 
ARTICLE 12: DEFAULT 
12 1 Events of Default A breach of this Lease by Tenant shall exist if any of 
the following events (individually an "Event of Default" and collectively "Events of Default") 
shall occui 
(a) Tenant shall have failed to pay the Rent within fifteen (15) days of when due 
and such failuie shall not have been cuied within ten (10) days aftei leceipt of wntten notice 
fiom Landloid lespecting such oveidue Rent payment, or 
(b) Tenant shall have failed to pay any othei chaige, oi any obligation of Tenant 
lequinng the payment of money undei the teims of this Lease (othei than the payment of Rent) 
within thnty (30) days of when due and such failure shall not have been cuied within thnty (30) 
days after leceipt of wntten notice from Landloid lespecting such oveidue payment, oi 
(c) Tenant shall have failed to peifoim any teim, covenant, oi condition of this 
Lease to be peifoimed by Tenant, except those lequinng the payment of money, and Tenant shall 
have failed to cuie same within thirty (30)days aftei wntten notice from Landloid, delivered in 
accoi dance with the piovisions of this Lease, wheie such failure could leasonably be cuied 
within said thnty (30) day penod (subject to the occunence of a Force Majeuie Event), piovided, 
howevei, that wheie such failuie could not leasonably be cured within said thnty (30)day penod, 
that Tenant shall not be in default unless it has failed to piomptly commence and theieaflei be 
continuing to make diligent and leasonable effoits to cuie such failuie as soon as piacticable and 
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in no event later than one hundred eighty (180) days (subject to extension based on the 
occurrence of a Force Majeure Event as provided in Section 22.3). 
(d) Abandonment of the Premises, Improvements or of the leasehold estate, 
except in accordance with Article 13 hereof; or 
(e) The subjection of any right or interest of Tenant under this Lease to 
attachment, execution, or other levy, or to seizure under legal process, if not released or 
appropriately bonded within ninety (90) days after receipt of written notice by Landlord; or 
(f) The appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Premises and/or 
Improvements or of Tenant's Estate or of Tenant's operations for any reason if not discharged 
within ninety (90) days of such appointment, including but not limited to, assignment for the 
benefit of creditors or voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, but not including 
receivership (i) pursuant to administration of the estate of any deceased or incompetent Tenant or 
of any deceased or incompetent individual partner of Tenant, or (ii) pursuant to a Permitted 
Mortgage, or (iii) instituted by Landlord, the event of default being not the appointment of a 
receiver at Landlord's instance but the event justifying the receivership, if any; or 
(g) An assignment by Tenant for the benefit of creditors or the filing of a 
voluntary or involuntary petition by or against Tenant under any law for the purpose of 
adjudicating Tenant as bankrupt; or for extending time for payment, adjustment or satisfaction of 
Tenant's liabilities to creditors generally; or for reorganization, dissolution, or arrangement on 
account of or to prevent bankruptcy or insolvency; unless the assignment or proceeding, and all 
consequent orders, adjudications, custodies, and supervisions are dismissed, vacated, or 
otherwise permanently stayed or terminated within ninety (90) days after the assignment, filing, 
or other initial event. 
12.2 Notice to Certain Persons. Landlord shall, before pursuing any remedy, 
give notice of any Event of Default to Tenant, to all Mortgagees whose names and mailing 
addresses were previously given to Landlord in the manner provided in this Lease. In addition, 
Landlord shall use its reasonable good faith efforts to give such notice to all Subtenants who 
have requested the same. Each notice of an Event of Default shall specify the Event of Default 
and shall describe any damage resulting from any such act. 
12.3 Landlord's Remedies. If any Event of Default by Tenant shall continue 
uncured, following notice of default as required by this Lease, for the period applicable to the 
default under the applicable provision of this Lease, subject to the rights of any Mortgagee under 
Article 5 hereof, Landlord shall have the following remedy in addition to all other rights and 
remedies provided by law or equity, to which Landlord may resort cumulatively or in the 
alternative: 
(a) Termination. If Landlord elects to terminate this Lease, then it shall give 
Tenant written notice of such termination and all of Tenant's rights in the Premises and in the 
Improvements shall terminate upon its receipt of such notice. Promptly after notice of 
termination, Tenant shall surrender and vacate the Premises and the Improvements in broom-
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clean condition, and Landlord may reenter and take possession of the Premises and the 
Improvements and eject all parties in possession or eject some and not others or eject none; 
provided that no Subtenant provided with a Nondisturbance Agreement shall be ejected and 
provided Landlord shall not eject a Mortgagee in possession that is then in compliance with the 
provisions of this Lease. Termination shall not relieve Tenant from the payment of any sums due 
to Landlord hereunder plus interest thereon from the date due at the Default Rate, or from any 
claim for damages previously accrued or then accruing against Tenant up to the date of 
termination. 
12.4 Cumulative Remedies. The remedies given to Landlord herein shall not be 
exclusive but shall be cumulative with and in addition to all remedies now or hereafter allowed 
by law and elsewhere provided in this Lease. 
12.5 Waiver of Breach. No waiver by a party of any default by the other shall 
constitute a waiver of any other breach or default by the other, whether of the same or any other 
covenant or condition. No waiver, benefit, privilege, or service voluntarily given or performed 
by a party shall give the other any contractual right by custom, estoppel, or otherwise. 
12.6 Tenant Remedies. In the event Landlord shall neglect or fail to perform or 
observe any of the covenants, provisions or conditions contained in this Lease on its part to be 
performed or observed within thirty (30) days after written notice of default, then in that event 
Landlord shall be liable to Tenant for any and all actual damages sustained by Tenant as a result 
of Landlord's breach. In addition to and together with any monetary or other damages or 
remedies Tenant may receive at law or equity, Tenant may terminate this Lease if Landlord's 
breach of this Lease persists past such thirty (30) day period and Landlord is not actively and 
diligently engaged in curing the same (which cure shall be completed within a reasonable period 
of time). 
ARTICLE 13: SURRENDER OF THE PREMISES 
On the Lease Expiration Date or earlier termination of this Lease pursuant to the 
provisions hereof, Tenant shall quit and surrender the Premises to Landlord without delay, and in 
reasonable good order, condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear (and damage and destruction 
or condemnation if this Lease is terminated pursuant to either Article 10 or _U) excepted. Such 
surrender of the Premises shall be accomplished withput the necessity for any payment therefor 
by Landlord. Upon such event, title to the Improvements shall automatically vest in Landlord 
without the execution of any further instrument; provided, however, Tenant covenants and 
agrees, upon either such event, to execute (at no cost or expense to Tenant) such appropriate 
documentation as may be reasonably requested by Landlord to transfer title to the Improvements 
to Landlord. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Article 14 below, no such 
surrender shall cause or be deemed to cause a merger of Landlord's Estate and Tenant's Estate, 
unless Landlord, and any Mortgagee holding a Permitted Mortgage, the lien of which was not 
reconveyed upon such surrender, expressly so agree in writing. 
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ARTICLE 14: PERMITTED SUBLEASES 
14.1 Tenant's Right to Sublease. Tenant may sub-ground lease or sub-space 
lease portions of the Premises during the Term of this Lease pursuant to Subleases with 
Subtenants who will occupy all or any portion of the Premises for the conduct of business 
consistent with the uses permitted herein, subject to the requirements set forth in this Article 14. 
14.2 Required Sublease Terms. Each Sublease shall contain the following 
terms and conditions: 
(a) The Sublease shall state that it is subject and subordinate to this Lease and 
to any extension, modifications or amendments of, this Lease, unless Landlord specifically 
requires that such Sublease be prior and superior to this Lease; 
(b) That in the event of the cancellation or termination of this Lease prior to 
the Lease Expiration Date, the Subtenant under such Sublease shall make full and complete 
attornment to Landlord for the balance of the term of such Sublease with the same force and 
effect as though said Sublease were originally made directly from Landlord to the Subtenant; 
provided that such Subtenant has received a non-disturbance agreement from Landlord, as 
provided below. 
14.3 Non-Disturbance Agreements. Landlord shall issue a commercially 
reasonable subordination, non-disturbance, and attornment agreement (each, a "Non-
Disturbance Agreement"), to each Subtenant requesting same, which Non-Disturbance 
Agreement shall require such Subtenant to acknowledge in writing to the effect that this Lease is 
prior to and paramount to the Sublease, and providing that Landlord shall recognize the Sublease 
and not disturb the Subtenant's possession thereunder so long as Subtenant is not in default under 
its Sublease (subject to the following sentence) and agrees to attorn to Landlord for the balance 
of the term of such Sublease with the same force and effect as though said Sublease were 
originally made directly from Landlord to the Subtenant. Any such Non-Disturbance Agreement 
may condition the Subtenant's right to non-disturbance on Landlord's continued receipt of Rent in 
the amount provided herein. In addition, such Non-Disturbance Agreement shall not prohibit the 
right of the Landlord to (or to require Tenant to) demolish Improvements on the Property other 
than (i) the premises under Sublease to which such Non-Disturbance Agreement relates and (ii) 
means of reasonable access thereto. 
14.4 Obligations under Lease. Landlord acknowledges and agrees that Tenant 
may assign any obligation or obligations under this Lease to any Subtenants without Landlord's 
prior consent; provided, that Tenant shall not be released from any such obligations in the event 
such Subtenant fails to perform same. 
ARTICLE 15: TRANSFER 
Landlord may not assign, convey and transfer its rights, interests and titles, or 
delegate any and all of its duties under this Lease. Tenant shall not transfer this Lease or its 
interest herein or in the Land, either directly or indirectly, by operation of law or otherwise, 
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without Landlord's prior written consent, which Landlord will not unreasonably refuse. A 
transfer will not affect tenant's liability under this lease agreement. 
ARTICLE 16: TENANT'S OPTION TO PURCHASE PREMISES 
Landlord hereby grants to Tenant an option exercisable in Tenant's sole and 
absolute discretion to purchase Landlord's Estate ("Purchase Option"), on the following terms 
and conditions: 
16.1 Exercise Period. The Purchase Option may be exercised during the period 
commencing on the first day of the sixty-first (61st) month of the Term and ending on the Lease 
Expiration Date.. 
16.2 Condition Precedent. It shall be a condition precedent to Tenant's right to 
exercise the Purchase Option that (i) this Lease shall, at the time of delivery of Tenant's exercise 
notice, be in full force and effect, and (ii) there shall not then exist any Event of Default by 
Tenant as of the date of delivery of Tenant's exercise notice that Tenant has not begun diligently 
to cure in accordance herewith as of such date 
16.3 Exercise. Tenant shall exercise its Purchase Option by giving written 
notice thereof ("Purchase Option Notice") to Landlord within the option exercise period 
described in Section 16.1 above. The "Option Purchase Price" (herein so called), shall be as set 
forth in Section 16.4 below. 
16.4 Option Purchase Price and Terms. 
(a) Option Purchase Price. The purchase price shall be $750,000.00. 
(b) Purchase Terms. The Option Purchase Price shall be paid in cash at Purchase 
Closing. 
16.5 Closing of Option. Following the exercise by Tenant of the Purchase 
Option, the "Purchase Closing" (herein so called) shall occur within sixty (60) days of the date 
on which Landlord receives Tenant's Purchase Option Notice. Upon the Purchase Closing, 
(a) the Purchase Option Price for Landlord's Estate shall be paid to the Landlord or its successor 
as described in Section 16.4, (b) Landlord's Estate shall be conveyed to Tenant by grant deed, bill 
of sale, general assignment and other appropriate transfer instruments, all in form reasonably 
acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord; (c) Landlord's Estate shall be subject to only the matters 
described in Section 1.1 and other matters reasonably approved by Tenant; (d) Landlord's Estate 
shall be conveyed using a general warranty deed; (e) Tenant and Landlord shall each be 
responsible for their own attorneys' fees; (f) Landlord shall provide at its sole expense a standard 
form Owner's Title Insurance Policy issued by First American Title Insurance Company, and (g) 
Tenant shall be responsible for all property taxes and cost of closing. 
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ARTICLE 17: NOTICES 
17.1 Any notice, approval, demand or other communication required or desired 
to be given pursuant to this Lease shall be in writing and shall be personally served (including by 
means of professional messenger service or air express service using receipts) or in lieu of 
personal service, deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested, and unless sooner received, each notice shall be deemed received 
seventy-two (72) hours after same shall have been so deposited in the United States mail 
addressed as set forth below: 
If to Landlord: Brown Family Holdings, L.C. 
do Rand D. Brown 
1434 E. 9400 S., Ste. 204 
Sandy, UT 84093 
If to Tenant: Holladay Towne Center, L.L.C. 
515 West Pickett Cir., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attention: Tom Hulbert 
Either Landlord or Tenant may change its respective address by giving written notice to the other 
in accordance with the provisions of this Section. 
ARTICLE 18: ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES 
18.1 Estoppel Certificates. Tenant agrees within thirty (30) days following 
request by Landlord or the holder of any deed of trust, mortgage or other encumbrance on 
Landlord's Estate to execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate to whichever of them has 
requested the same. Landlord agrees promptly following request by Tenant or a Mortgagee to 
execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate to whichever of them has requested the same. The 
term "Estoppel Certificate" shall mean an estoppel certificate, certifying (a) that this Lease is 
unmodified and in full force and effect, or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification 
and certifying that this Lease, as so modified, is in full force and effect and the date to which the 
Rent and other charges are paid in advance, if any, (b) that there are no uncured defaults on the 
part of Landlord and Tenant hereunder, or if there exist any uncured defaults on the part of 
Landlord and/or Tenant hereunder stating the nature of such uncured defaults on the part of 
Landlord and/or Tenant, and (c) the coiTectness of such other information respecting the status of 
this Lease as may be reasonably required by the party hereto requesting execution of such 
Estoppel Certificate. A party's failure to so execute and deliver an Estoppel Certificate following 
written request as required above, shall be conclusive upon such party that as of the date of said 
request for the same (a) that this Lease is in full force and effect, without modification except as 
may be represented by the party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel Certificate, (b) that 
there are no uncured Events of Default in Landlord's or Tenant's obligations under this Lease 
except as may be represented by the party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel 
Certificate, and (c) that no Rent has been paid in advance except as may be represented by the 
party hereto requesting execution of such Estoppel Certificate. 
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ARTICLE 19: ENFORCEMENT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
19.1 In any proceeding or controversy associated with or arising out of this 
Lease or a claimed or actual breach hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from 
the other party as a part of the prevailing party's costs, such party's actual and reasonable 
attorneys" fees and court costs. 
ARTICLE 20: NO MERGER 
20.1 No Merger; Subleases. The voluntary or other surrender of this Lease by 
Tenant, or a mutual cancellation thereof, shall not work a merger and shall, at the option of 
Landlord, operate as an assignment to Landlord of any or all Subleases of Subtenants. 
20.2 Permitted Mortgages. Landlord agrees that neither the surrender, 
cancellation, expiration or termination of this Lease, nor Landlord's acquisition of Tenant's Estate 
by any means contemplated hereunder, shall, either by the election of Landlord or by operation of 
law, work a merger of Landlord's Estate and Tenant's Estate unless and until all indebtedness 
under any Permitted Mortgage has been repaid pursuant to the terms thereof. The lien of such 
Permitted Mortgage shall remain unaffected and in full force and effect upon and following the 
occurrence of any of the events described in the preceding sentence, and Landlord shall be 
subject to, and bound by, the provisions of such Permitted Mortgage as the successor tenant 
hereunder following the occurrence of any of such events. 
ARTICLE 21: QUIET ENJOYMENT - LANDLORD'S RIGHT TO INSPECT 
21.1 Landlord covenants that, provided no Event of Default has occurred under 
the terms of the Lease and has continued beyond all applicable cure periods set forth in this Lease 
or any other written agreement between Landlord and any Mortgagee, Tenant shall have quiet 
and peaceful possession of the Premises as against Landlord and any person claiming the same 
by, through or under Landlord. Landlord reserves the right to enter the Premises and the 
Improvements during normal business hours upon reasonable prior written notice for purposes of 
conducting normal and periodic inspections of the Premises, provided such inspections shall be 
subject to the terms of, and shall not interfere with, the rights of any Subtenant under any 
Sublease. 
ARTICLE 22: GENERAL 
22.1 Captions. The captions used in this Lease are for the purpose of 
convenience only and shall not be construed to limit or extend the meaning of any part of this 
Lease. 
22.2 Counterparts. Any executed copy of this Lease shall be deemed an 
original for all purposes. This Lease may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which 
shall be an original, and all of which together shall constitute a single instrument. 
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22.3 Time of Essence. Time is of the essence for the performance of each 
covenant and term of this Lease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any non-monetary obligation of 
Tenant or Landlord which cannot be satisfied due to war, strikes, acts of God or other events 
which are beyond the reasonable control of Tenant or Landlord, as the case may be (each, a 
"Force Majeure Event"), shall be excused until the cessation of such Force Majeure Event. In 
addition, Tenant's Rent obligations hereunder, and all dates for the performance of any of 
Tenant's other obligations hereunder, shall be automatically extended on a day for day basis in 
the event of any act of Landlord in violation of this Lease which actually delays Tenant's 
performance, as hereinabove set forth in this Lease, provided that (a) Tenant has previously 
notified Landlord of such fact in writing and Landlord has not cured the cause of such delay 
within three (3) days of the receipt of said notice and (b) in no event shall any Force Majeure 
Event excuse any obligation for longer than a 24 month period from the occurrence of such Force 
Majeure Event. 
22.4 Severability. If any one or more of the provisions contained herein shall 
for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, 
illegality or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision of this Lease, but this Lease 
shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or unenforceable provision had not been contained 
herein. 
22.5 Interpretation. This Lease shall be construed and enforced in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. The language in all parts of this Lease shall in all cases be 
construed as a whole according to its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against either Landlord 
or Tenant. When the context of this Lease requires, the neuter gender includes the masculine, the 
feminine, a partnership or corporation or joint venture or other entity, and the singular includes 
the plural. 
22.6 Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements contained in this 
Lease shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their 
respective permitted heirs, successors, and assigns (to the extent this Lease is assignable). 
22.7 Waivers. The waiver of any breach of any term, covenant or condition 
herein contained shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such term, covenant or condition or any 
subsequent breach of the same or any other term, covenant or condition herein contained. 
22.8 Remedies. All remedies herein conferred shall be deemed cumulative and 
no one remedy shall be exclusive of any other remedy herein conferred or created by law. 
22.9 Good Faith. Except where a party hereto is specifically permitted to act in 
its sole and absolute discretion, each party hereto agrees to act reasonably and in good faith with 
respect to the performance and fulfillment of the terms of each and every covenant and condition 
contained in this Lease. 
22.10 No Partnership. The parties hereto agree that nothing contained in this 
Lease shall be deemed or construed as creating a partnership, joint venture, or association 
between Landlord and Tenant, or cause either party to be responsible in any way for the debts or 
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obligations of the other party, and neither the method of computing Rent nor any other provision 
contained in this Lease nor any acts of the parties hereto shall be deemed to create any 
relationship between Landlord and Tenant other than the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
22.11 Integration. This Lease, and the Exhibits and addenda, if any, attached 
hereto, constitute the entire agreement between the parties, and there are no agreements or 
representations between the parties except as expressed herein. The recitals set forth above are 
incorporated herein and made a part of this Lease. All prior negotiations and agreements 
between Landlord and Tenant with respect to the subject matter hereof are superseded by this 
Lease. Except as otherwise provided herein, no subsequent change or addition to this Lease shall 
be binding unless in writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
22.12 Commissions. Landlord and Tenant each represent and warrant to the 
other that they have employed no broker, finder or other person in connection with the 
transactions contemplated under this Lease which might result in the other party being held liable 
for all or any portion of a commission hereunder. Landlord and Tenant each hereby agree to 
indemnify and hold the other free and harmless from and against all claims and liability arising 
by reason of the incorrectness of the representations and warranties made by such party in this 
Section, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs. 
22.13 Survival. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this 
Lease, the provisions (including, without limitation, covenants, agreements, representations, 
warranties, obligations, and liabilities described therein) of this Lease which from their sense and 
context are intended to survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease (whether or not 
such provision expressly provides as such) shall survive such expiration or earlier termination of 
this Lease and continue to be binding upon the applicable party. 
[SIGNATURES ON NEXT PAGE] 
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LANDLORD AND TENANT hereby enter into and execute this Lease as of the date first 
set forth above. 
LANDLORD 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDING, L.C. 
a Utah limited liability company 




HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability company 
Bv: ]//frrry?&z. <f- ft4<s<&^?~ 





Known as 2240 E. Laney Avenue, Holladay, Salt Lake County, Utah and Legally Described as 




1. Property Taxes and Assessments accruing for the year 2005 and thereafter. Landlord 




1 THE COURT: You're still - I'm still lost as to why 
2 you couldn't just simply say we're going to bring quiet title 
3 action with respect to this property, we are the leasehold 
4 interest with an option to purchase and anyone who challenges 
5 our contention that we have clear title can come in and 
6 object to it and we'll send a copy of this to the current 
7 owner of Lot 26 just to make sure they're aware. Why 
8 couldn't you have done that? 
9 MR. MILLER: Because I believe that's enforcing the 
10 fee right, Your Honor, not the tenant right. 
11 THE COURT: But I mean, whose better to do that 
12 than you? 
13 MR. MILLER: The person -
14 THE COURT: You're the only one that's worried 
15 about it. They're not worried about ip. 
16 MR. MILLER: The BFP who claims to have purchased 
17 this (inaudible) notice. 
18 THE COURT: So are you a BFP. They're not worried 
19 about it. They wouldn't even come into your case if you 
20 filed it. They would sit on the sidelines. 
21 MR. MILLER: I don't become a BFP until I take the 
22 deed, right? 
23 THE COURT: No, you're a bonafide purchaser of the 
24 leasehold interest under your lease. 
25 MR. MILLER: But I'm not a BFP of the fee until I 
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get the fee. 
THE COURT: No, of course not but you're saying 
it's the same thing under Paragraph 1.1. 
MR. MILLER: I'm saying the title issues are the 
same but not my rights. 
THE COURT: Sure, but the concerns, the legal 
issues are the same under that provision and in fact it 
strengthens your argument, or would strengthen an argument 
that you had legal title to the property or legal title to 
your leasehold interest, in any event. 
MR. MILLER: That I can get it in five years, but 
my problem is I need it now. 
THE COURT: Well, but I'm saying then you have a 
leasehold interest now and your leasehold interest now is not 
suppose to be subject to any kind of a prescriptive easement 
or a recorded easement over part of the property and you have 
a concern that it is for whatever reason but you have a 
concern that it is so you bring a quiet title action and you 
say, we have a leasehold interest, we have an option to 
purchase, we want to make sure that we can finance this 
property and we're worried about this potential easement. 
So you bring your action and it's regarding 
property such-and-such and we want the court to quiet title 
to it and to settle our interest as a leasehold holder in 
this property free and clear of any purported easement. So 
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1 you file that action, the landlord sits on the sideline 
2 because he doesn't contest that. 
3 MR. MILLER: We would be suing the landlord saying 
4 you breached titled 1.1 — 
5 THE COURT: You don't sue the landlord, there's no 
6 breach of anything. You just say you want to quiet the title 
7 to make sure that no one has a claim that's contrary to our 
8 claim. 
9 MR. MILLER: Well, Your Honot, if there is a claim 
10 that's contrary to our claim then it has to be a violation of 
11 1.1. If it's not a violation of 1.1 then there is not going 
12 to be an easement to violate your claim. 
13 THE COURT: But what would happen is if the court 
14 should determine that there is a violation and that there is 
15 an easement then you've got a cause of action against the 
16 landlord. 
17 MR. MILLER: My point, I suppose is we would be 
18 doing the same thing we're going here but we'd have a 
19 different party here and there would be arguments but— 
20 THE COURT: Exactly, you wouldn't have the landlord 
21 here. They wouldn't be incurring the expenses that they're 
22 incurring today defending it and that's what they're 
23 objecting to among other things, I guess. 
24 MR. MILLER: They could have brought them in too. 
25 I THE COURT: You filed the action. Why should they 
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1 have to bring in anybody? Why should they even have to hire 
2 a lawyer? They should just be sitting there saying, you 
3 know, to the court, maybe they'd be in the back row today 
4 saying boy, we sure hope the judge decides that there's no 
5 easement and if the they were really worried that the judge 
6 is going come out and say that there is an easement, they may 
7 move to intervene as a party in interest. 
8 MR. MILLER: I would have to bring in the party, we 
9 are the party — 
10 THE COURT: You'd serve them notice of quiet title 
11 action. If they don't want to come in they don't have to 
12 come in. 
13 MR. MILLER: I guess my point is, Your Honor, it 
14 wouldn't just be a quiet title action, it would be a breach 
15 of 1.1, same thing we've got here. 
16 THE COURT: There is no breach of 1.1 until the 
17 Court determines that there's an easement and right now I 
18 don't see any easement. I don't see one as of record from 
19 the affidavits both of you have submitted, I don't see one as 
20 a prescriptive easement. 
21 MR. MILLER: I'm sorry Your Honor, I would bring it 
22 against the breached lease. They would argue. We'd be here 
23 but we'd have a different party also saying - it wouldn't 
24 make a whole bit of difference but we would have total 
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MR. MILLER: Then 1.1 has no meaning in our lease. 
THE COURT: Well, of course it has a meaning in 
your lease. You say that it's violated because someone might 
come in and raise an argument. That's not damage today that 
someone might come in and raise an argument. 
MR. MILLER: The damage is we can't get insurance 
and we've done that, we've tried. 
THE COURT: They don't guarantee that you can get 
insurance, do they? 
MR. MILLER: They'd guarantee title which is why we 
wanted Exhibit B of the permitted exceptions so it could be 
insured. 
THE COURT: Where do they guarantee title? 
MR. MILLER: 1.1. 
THE COURT: And you're saying they violated a 
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1 guarantee of title because of why? 
2 MR. MILLER: Because the existence of this easement 
3 preventing us from getting — 
4 THE COURT: The Court finds that there is no 
5 easement. Where is the violation of 1.1? 
6 MR. MILLER: Well, without a third party sitting 
7 here it doesn't really help. 
8 THE COURT: That's my point and that's why I don't 
9 understand why we're here with this party as a defendant in 
10 this case. 
11 MR. MILLER: They're the party we contracted with, 
12 they gave us the title. If they'd given us a warranty deed 
13 in five years that I believe is no different, we'd be doing 
14 the same thing, bringing an action under the breach of 
15 warranty. There's no difference in doing it now or doing it 
16 in five years, it's the same provision. 
17 THE COURT: But there's no reason why you couldn't 
18 bring a quiet title action today as a leasehold holder, a 
19 leasehold interest holder. Why didn't you bring a quiet 
20 title action today or six months ago of whenever you brought 
21 this action? 
22 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, we've been through that. 
23 I don't believe we have the standing and — 
24 THE COURT: I'm telling you you do have standing. 
25 You have the standing under your lease and your option to 
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1 purchase goes with the lease. You have standing. If they 
2 didn't give decent title to you, you could sue them for it. 
3 If you think that there's some party out there that might 
4 come in and raise the issue then that party needs to be here 
5 if you're going to have a ruling that there is no cloud on 
6 that title. 
7 So I mean, I don't know what that does to your 
8 lawsuit. It seems to me the problem that you have is as you 
9 grab this tiger by the tail and the tiger is coming around 
10 and biting you and you didn't have to grab it by the tail, 
11 you could have avoided that, let the tiger come in if it 
12 wanted to which it wouldn't because it has no reason to be 
13 concerned about it. Now if you really think there's some 
14 chance that some judge can say, yeah, there's a easement 
15 here, maybe they would come in but that's their decision 
16 based on that kind of an action. They wouldn't be required 
17 to come in. They could sit on the sidelines and get a 
18 decision that, yeah, there's an easement and they're subject 
19 to it. That would be their choice but you haven't given them 
20 a choice. You've brought the action against them. They've 
21 counterclaimed. Now they're trying to say we don't want to 
22 deal with you guys because you're going to nothing but a 
23 headache to us for the next five years until you buy the 
24 property and because of that they're saying maybe they 
25 I violated this lease, how are we going to get them out of here 
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1 and throw them out and you end up with your client losing the 
2 loss of its bargain initially and trying to get a piece of 
3 property to develop and all the effort that they've gone 
4 through up to this point. 
5 And they're saying, well, yeah, throw them out, 
6 they violated by playing games with the payment of rent and 
7 they violated also by bringing this action and dragging us in 
8 and making us incur all these legal costs. 
9 And what I'm saying to you is I don't find the 
10 first argument very good but I find the second argument a 
11 reasonable argument from their position and that they 
12 probably incurred some significant damage in terms of legal 
13 fees. I don't know if they've incurred any other damage but 
14 certainly in terms of legal fees. 
15 MR. MILLER: With all due respect to the second, I 
16 don't see it as a breach of the lease itself. I understand 
17 where Your Honor is coming from but I think one party trying 
18 to enforce — 
19 THE COURT: Does the lease have an attorneys fees 
20 provision in it? Does it say if you bring an action and you 
21 lose, you pay attorney's fees? 
22 MR. MILLER: I believe there is. 
23 MR. ATKIN: It does, Your Honor. 
24 MR. MILLER: I believe it does. 
25 THE COURT: Either way, you're going to get stuck 
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1 with attorney's fees. 
2 MR. MILLER: I thought you were addressing the 
3 issue of termination of lease, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Well, yeah, you can terminate the lease 
5 and argue that you've caused them that damage or you can say 
6 we're not going to terminate the lease but they win the 
7 lawsuit and they get attorney's fees that way. You're still 
8 able to go ahead with your client's project but you end up 
9 having to pay for their costs in the interim and you now have 
10 a landlord who is sitting on pins and needles waiting for the 
11 next breach to happen where he can come after you or your 
12 client. That's where I see the case as is exists. 
13 MR. MILLER: Anything else, Your Honor? 
14 THE COURT: No. Mr. Atkin, do you have anything 
15 else that you want to say? 
16 MR. ATKIN: Just very quickly, Your Honor. My 
17 clients owned this income property and it had a regular flow 
18 of income and as the Court has pointed out, there's no 
19 penalty for this scheme of late — 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, but I don't know that that's 
21 something - that's a drafting problem probably more than 
22 anything else or original agreement if they try to get it but 
23 the fact is that the lease permits the action that they've 
24 engaged in here. 
25 MR. ATKIN: Your Honor -
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1 THE COURT: For example, it's conceivable that a 
2 party could have problems one month after another. You're 
3 saying, well, we've got to look at the motivation of the 
4 problem but I don't see anything in the lease that describes 
5 that and I don't think that there's anything that's broad 
6 enough to generate even by implication that they couldn't do 
7 that. 
8 MR. ATKIN: I have nothing further to say then, 
9 Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right. I think if parties really 
11 wanted to prevent it, you know, they'd have put in a fee or 
12 interest provision or something like that. That's how you 
13 prevent it. 
14 MR. ATKIN: That was the only issue I had anyway. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I think my feeling is here that 
16 with respect to these two parties, that there is no easement, 
17 that there is no recorded easement that's valid. In fact, 
18 the one that was recorded I think was recorded on the wrong 
19 parcel, therefore, is void. I don't see any evidence of 
20 prescriptive easement. The only party that today seems to me 
21 that could argue a prescriptive easement would be someone who 
22 would benefit from it and we don't have anybody here claiming 
23 a prescriptive easement and, in fact, if anything, the 
24 evidence is to the contrary that there is a blockage that 
25 would block the easement both in the form of the storage 
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1 sheds as well as the (inaudible) and in addition, that 
2 there's been no evidence of usage of the easement and at 
3 least for a period of 10 years, it hasn't been possible. So 
4 if there were an easement vis-a-vie these two parties, it 
5 would have been abandoned by this point. So I don't see an 
6 easement either prescriptive or one by legal right. 
7 I don't find that the lack of - put it this way, I 
8 don't find that the gamesmanship that was played by the 
9 plaintiff to be acceptable conduct. On the other hand, I 
10 don't find it to be unlawful or conduct that would be in 
11 violation of the lease. I think, if it indeed was to, you 
12 know, try to put some pressure on the landlord, I think it is 
13 an unsuccessful way of engaging in some self-help that the 
14 parties just ought not to do. But on the other hand I'm not 
15 going to find it to be a violation of the lease. 
16 With respect to bringing the lawsuit, I'm going to 
17 dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit and I'm also going to dismiss 
18 the counterclaims except for attorney's fees which I'm going 
19 to grant to the defendants in this case because they have 
20 prevailed I think on the major issue and that is with respect 
21 to the easement. There really isn't any cloud on this title 
22 and it is so clear it seems to me to the Court that this case 
23 should not have been brought even but again, I'm not ruling 
24 that that's a violation of the lease. So I think that leases 
25 the plaintiff where they were in November or whenever it was 
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1 that this whole thing started, maybe it was earlier Acause 
2 that's when the counterclaim was filed. 
3 As far as I'm concerned I don't see any reason why 
4 you couldn't still bring a quiet title action based on your 
5 leasehold interest. It seems to me that you have sufficient 
6 interest in this property through your lease and your option 
7 to purchase to ask a court to quiet title to this property 
8 and if you wanted to file an amended complaint, for example, 
9 in this case, not saying you should or you have to but if you 
10 wanted to file an amended complaint deleting the defendant 
11 and asking the court simply to quiet title with respect to 
12 this property to make clear that there was no effective 
13 easement for the purposes of financing or title insurance, 
14 whatever you need, I would find that you had standing to do 
15 that based on your lease and the option to purchase which I 
16 find are still in effect. 
17 Anything further? 
18 MR. ATKIN: I don't believe so, Your Honor. Would 
19 you like me to prepare the order? 
2 0 THE COURT: Yeah, if you think you can. 
21 MR. ATKIN: I'll do that. 
22 THE COURT: I know both sides have been taking 
23 notes so I'll assume you'll come up with an appropriate 
24 order. Let the other side see it, of course. 
25 MR. ATKIN: Certainly, Your Honor, I will. 
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1 THE COURT: Can you do that within a week? 
2 MR. ATKIN: Your Honor, the rule gives me 15 days — 
3 THE COURT: I know, I'm asking if you can do it 
4 within a week? 
5 MR. ATKIN: I could do that but it would be - I've 
6 got a real hectic next week but I will — 
7 THE COURT: But you've got good people in your 
8 office. 
9 MR. ATKIN: We'll do it in a week. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. All right, If you have a 
11 problem, call the other side and let them take a shot at it 
12 and then whoever gets the proposed order, I'll give you a 
13 week also to respond and get it back to the court and so I 
14 guess I'm dismissing the defendant and granting leave to the 
15 plaintiff to amend the complaint. 
16 MR. ATKIN: Fair enough, I'll go ahead and do that. 
17 THE COURT: Okay? 
18 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I don't want to be a 
19 problem here. I intend a quiet title action to include the 
20 defendants should they wish to come in. I think it's only 
21 proper that I include them in the amended complaint. It's 
22 their rights I would be affecting. 
23 THE COURT: Well, I guess you could name them and 
24 they could enter just — 
25 MR. ATKIN: No contest to the quiet title? 
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1 THE COURT: Yeah. 
2 MR. ATKIN: We could do that. 
3 THE COURT: I wouldn't see a problem with that, 
4 Okay. All right. Another fine kettle of fish. Thank you 
5 all. 






















Blake S. Atkin #4466 
William O. Kimball #9460 
BrennanH. Moss #10267 
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
136 South Main, Suite 401A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-0300 
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No.: 060913167 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment on March 12,2007. Plaintiff was represented by Blake Miller, defendant was represented 
by Blake S. Atkin. Having read the written submissions of the parties, having heard the arguments 
of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property that is the subject of this dispute is in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
FILED ilSTRICTGOURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 01 2007 
2. Defendant is the fee owner of a parcel of real estate known as lot 27, Peony gardens. 
3. In March of 2005, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Ground Lease with regard 
to lot 27 . The Ground Lease provides that it is a triple net lease and that rent would be paid without 
offset and without cost to the landlord. The Ground Lease further authorizes the Tenant to contest, 
at its own expense, any legal requirements, defined as including any covenants restrictions or 
conditions of record. The Ground Lease also provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
actions relating to the Ground Lease. 
4. In about 1980, the owner of Lot 27, who also owned lot 26, Peony Gardens, recorded 
a notice of contract on lot 26 that described an easement across lot 27. That notice of contract was 
never recorded against lot 27. 
5. Thereafter, lot 27 was conveyed to defendant's predecessor in title without any 
mention of the easement. 
6. Through mesne conveyances, none of which mention the easement, the property came 
into the possession and ownership of defendant. 
7. The easement was never recorded against lot 27. 
8. There is no evidence of the easement on the ground. For at least the past 20 years, 
the path of the easement has been impassable because of the existence of a berm and for the past 10 
years, permanent storage facilities have been built upon the path of the easement. 
9. No one has ever made a claim to the easement or attempted to use the easement. 
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10. No one has ever tried to interfere with plaintiffs quiet enjoyment of its leasehold on 
account of the easement. 
11. At the time they entered into the ground lease, neither party had any knowledge of 
the easement. 
12. On August 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in Third District 
Court seeking declaratory relief, breach of contract, and specific performance, claiming that the 
easement is a violation of the lease. 
13. In November, 2006, defendant filed a counterclaim for unlawful detainer pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-36-8 claiming that the suit and defendants prior pattern of not making 
rental payments until plaintiff had hired a lawyer to demand payment were in breach of the lease by 
violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and causing the Landlord to incur costs in 
connection with the collection of rents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is no easement on lot 27. There is no evidence of an easement on the ground 
and to the extent that an easement purporting to affect lot 27 is recorded against lot 26, that easement 
is void because it was not recorded against lot 27. 
2. Because there is no easement affecting lot 27, there is no basis for the plaintiffs 
claims against the defendant and this action should not have been brought against the landlord, 
causing the landlord to incur costs. 
3 
3. If the easement anciently recorded against lot 26 creates legal requirements that 
interfere with plaintiffs use of its leasehold, plaintiff has the right under the lease and by virtue of 
its leasehold to contest those legal requirements by quiet title action or otherwise, but such action 
should be conducted in such a manner as to result in no cost to the Landlord. 
4. The plaintiffs pattern of late rental payments, while not appropriate conduct, is not 
a material breach of the lease at this time where the conduct stopped at the demand of the Landlord 
and has been followed by consistent on time rental payments. The costs to the Landlord caused by 
that behavior can be remedied at this time by the payment of the Landlord's attorney fees and costs. 
The filing of this action, while not appropriate conduct under the lease, is not a material breach of 
the lease because the cost caused to the Landlord can be remedied at this time by the payment of the 
Landlord's attorney fees and costs. 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiffs complaint against defendant will be dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant's counterclaim for unlawful detainer will be dismissed without prejudice, 
should the conduct of the Tenant be repeated in the future. 
3. Leave is granted to the plaintiff to amend the complaint in this matter, so long as the | 
allegations of tne amended complaint require nothing on the part of the Landlord except to file a 
notice of no contest to any action to quiet title against the easement. 
4. Plaintiff shall pay all of defendant's costs and attorney fees relating to this action and 
4 
JJt^ih ^^^J^1^7'^^ 
to defendant's collection of ren/ Such costs and attorney fees shall be established by affidavit. 
fMuA,20 DATED this J _ day o jJtwKi, 2 07. 
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 060913167 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Pursuant to the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, it is hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiffs complaint against defendant is dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. That defendant's counterclaim for unlawful detainer is dismissed at this time without 
prejudice to the Landlord renewing such a claim if in the future the Tenant engages in conduct that 
results in costs to the Landlord in violation of the covenants of the Ground Lease. 
3. Plaintiff shall pay defendant's costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with this 
action and in connection with defendant's collection of rents from plaintiffa-^ JCA^^AMT 
DATED this J_ day of Ma«*, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I day of March, 2007,1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, AND 
JUDGMENT upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Blake Miller 
James W. Anderson 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROWN FAMILY HOLDINGS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Case No.: 060913167 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment on March 12, 2007 and on May 1, 2007 regarding the order and award of attorney fees. 
Based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees submitted by Defendant and being fully 
advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order: 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiff shall pay Defendant's attorney fees in the amount of $39,675.50 and costs 
in the amount of $5,818.06 for a total award of $45,493.56. 
2. The attorney fees and costs shall be paid by Plaintiff within 20 days of entry of this 
Order re: Award of Attorney Fees and Costs @J 
JD21391284 pages: 
Order to Defendant. 
3. Defendant shall be entitled to all attorney fees and costs incurred in the collection of 
the attorney fees and costs awarded to Defendant. 
4. To the extent that additional objections or pleadings are submitted by Plaintiff and 
additional attorney fees and costs are expended by Defendant as a result, Defendant 
shall be entitled to file a motion to supplement the amount of attorney fees and costs 
incurred. 
DATED this p( day of May, 2007. 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing ORDER RE: AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS in the U.S. mail, first 
class, postage prepaid on this 1 day of May, 2007, to the following: 
Paxton R. Guymon 
James W. Anderson 
Miller Guymon, P.C. 
165 South Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 








1 it the other way around, you get your fees if there's a 
2 breach and I think Utah law is pretty clear that you only get 
3 your fees for the portion in which you're prevailing. They 
4 did not prevail on that. Those are my only two objections, 
5 Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Let's go back to, first of 
7 all, with respect to the easement. I think the Court found 
8 that the unrecorded or the document that was not recorded 
9 with respect to Lot 27 was void. I think it's correct to say 
10 that that doesn't necessarily mean there is no easement 
11 because I suppose someone could come in and establish an 
12 easement with evidence that we don't have right now. 
13 MR. ATKIN: Would you like me to address that? 
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MR. ATKIN: The Court's judgment was that there is 
16 no easement and while it may be true that a third party might 
17 be able to come in and say, well, I'm not bound by that 
18 judgment, that burden should be on the third party that's 
19 coming in to try and make that kind of an argument. There's 
20 no reason for this Court to couch its decision in caveats 
21 that there might be somebody out there that might be able to 
22 assert that they are not bound by the judgment. The Court 
23 had before it two parties and the Court ruled that there was 
24 no easement based on the evidence that was presented to the 
25 court. If they do amend the complaint and bring in a third 
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1 party, there may be numerous circumstances under which that 
2 third party would be bound by this statement. That third 
3 party might have some relationship to either the defendant or 
4 the plaintiff and be in privity to them such that the 
5 judgment would bind them. That third party might have known 
6 about this controversy and intentionally sat on the sidelines 
7 rather than being involved. In those circumstances they 
8 might well be bound by the judgment of the Court. I fail to 
9 see any legitimate concern in the Court stating its 
10 conclusions and facts and decision with regard to these 
11 parties and then if there's later a third party let that 
12 third party bear the burden of trying to say they're not 
13 bound by the judgment. 
14 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, using the same rationale, 
15 I don't see there's any reason to go beyond the two parties 
16 in this action in making a finding. You found for the 
17 purpose of the lease there was no easement that came within 
18 the terms of 1.1 of the lease. 
19 THE COURT: Also, there was no prescriptive 
20 easement. 
21 MR. MILLER: Right. 
22 THE COURT: Vis-a-vie these parties. 
23 MR. MILLER: Vis-a-vie these parties. We have no 
24 objection to that. We think that's what the Court ordered 
25 and that's what we think should be — 
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1 THE COURT: What about his argument that if 
2 somebody wants to come in and say I'm not bound by that 
3 ruling, they can do it? 
4 MR. MILLER: I think we're putting the cart before 
5 the horse if we make an order - I thought it was (inaudible) 
6 against my own interest because I'd love to have an order 
7 saying it's quiet, the title is quieted and I can take it to 
8 the title company. I just don't think it procedurally right 
9 because until that party comes in and makes the claim, I 
10 think it's improper to make a ruling that stems beyond these 
11 two parties. That's why Your Honor gave us the authority to 
12 file -
13 THE COURT: I tell you Mr. Atkin's argument is that 
14 it doesn't extend, it just extends to the litigants and 
15 others who might be bound by other rules of procedure. So 
16 I'll accept that argument that Mr. Atkin has made. 
17 Let's go onto the other issue on the attorney's 
18 fees. I guess I'm not quite clear what your argument is. 
19 Maybe you could expand on that a little bit for me, Mr. 
20 Miller, so that I'll understand that better. 
21 MR. MILLER: I'm sorry for being less than clear. 
22 THE COURT: It's not your fault. I think it's 
23 probably my fault for not being more perceptive. Go ahead. 
24 MR. MILLER: There are two aspects that the 
25 defendants were arguing were breaches. One was regarding a 
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1 delay of payment. The other was bringing the action 
2 regarding 1.1 of the title issue. The later Your Honor ruled 
3 there is no easement, no prescriptive or otherwise between 
4 these parties, no easement and they were the prevailing 
5 party. 
6 As to the delay of rent payment issue you found 
7 that was not a breach. In the proposed order they still want 
8 fees for that, claiming that payment fees renders the breach, 
9 corrects the breach. That's inaccurate because you didn't 
10 find there was a breach, Your Honor, and even if you did you 
11 wouldn't pay fees in order to rectify a breach, you'd pay 
12 fees because there was a breach and secondly, Your Honor, 
13 attorney's fees in Utah law are granted for the prevailing 
14 party on the issues they win. We cited a case in our 
15 memorandum or objection that indicates that. That's all, 
16 Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: So are they entitled to any fees at 
18 all? 
19 MR. MILLER: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: They would be entitled to fees on the 
21 other issue but not on the rent issue? 
22 MR. MILLER: Correct. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Atkin, do you want to respond to 
24 that? 
25 MR. ATKIN: Yes, Your Honor. Couple of responses. 
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1 First of all while the Court did find that the Court was not 
2 going to grant the remedy that we had requested in our 
3 counterclaim, namely eviction of the plaintiffs for the delay 
4 in paying rent, the Court did state that the Court found that 
5 that conduct was not appropriate but that the Court was not 
6 going to grant us the death penalty remedy of eviction. 
7 No doubt the Court's decision was based in large 
8 measure upon the fact that after we wrote them the letter 
9 that said you're in breach of the lease by this practice of 
10 regularly withholding rent until we makie a demand upon you 
11 and then waiving the full 20 days after the demand to pay the 
12 rent, after we sent them that letter saying you're in breach 
13 for doing that and we're going to seek to have you evicted, 
14 they then changed their course of action and began paying the 
15 rent on time under the terms of the lease. When we were here 
16 last time they argued strenuously that because of that change 
17 in conduct that the Court shouldn't find that they were in 
18 breach of the lease and therefore subject to eviction. While 
19 the Court did not grant us the remedy we were seeking, namely 
20 eviction, we did obtain in this controversy, we obtained 
21 relief, that is they stopped the conduct that was 
22 objectionable under the terms of the lease. No doubt if the 
23 defendants had continued that conduct the Court's decision 
24 could have been different and the Court could have granted us 



























the controversy and : 
lease with regard to 
litigation. It says 
that has arisen with 
party is entitled to 
Lf the Court looks at the language of the 
attorney's fees, it's not related to 
whenever there has been a controversy 
regard to the lease, that the prevailing 
attorney's fees. 
It's our position that we're the prevailing party 
on this rent collection matter because when we brought the 
counterclaim, sent them the letter saying stop doing this, 
you're in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, they stopped the conduct. 
Secondly, the Court will recall that their 
justification for this regular monthly withholding of rent 
until my client had hired us and we had to send the demand 
letters was they said in their letter, we're doing this 
because you haven't brought this action to clear up this 
easement that's on the property. So their conduct was 
conduct designed to put pressure on us to do something that 
the Court has now determined we had no duty to do and so in 
that regard we're also the prevailing party with regard to 
this whole rent collection controversy because it was tied 
into this claim they had that we had some duty with regard to 
the easement. So anyway you look at it, we are the 
prevailing party with regard to the rent collection issue and 
should be entitled to recover the fees. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that? 
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1 MR. MILLER: Briefly, Your Honor. Your Honor, 
2 actually I think the reason why Your Honor found there was 
3 not a breach was that's the way the lease provided. It was 
4 under the terms of the lease and the defendants accepted the 
5 lease payments even though paid later. So, that's I think if 
6 you read the transcript, that's why the Court came out. 
7 Looking at the transcript Your Honor, Your Honor 
8 indicated that I'm not going - with respect to the rent, I'm 
9 not going to find it to be a violation of the lease and 
10 dismissed the complaint and granted the defendants attorney's 
11 fees because they prevailed on the issue regarding the 
12 easement. Utah law (inaudible) Clarke says that when you are 
13 successful in one but not another you are entitled to fees on 
14 that matter. So as to the easement, yes, that's what the 
15 court ordered clearly. I don't believe the Court said and 
16 even though I find there's no breach, I'm going to give the 
17 defendants attorney's fees on something I found there was no 
18 breach. That's what the order does. 
19 THE COURT: Didn't the Court say though that 
20 consistently paying the rent late as you were doing was not 
21 in keeping with the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
22 dealing? 
23 MR. MILLER: No, I think the opposite, Your Honor. 
24 If you give me a minute I can find the language. 
2 5 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. MILLER: I remember reading it last night, Your 
2 Honor. I apologize for the delay. 
3 Attached to the defendant's memorandum is a kind of 
4 typewritten of the audio. The first paragraph in that is 
5 Your Honor's comments. About the middle of it you're talking 
6 about the delay of rent, Your Honor says, "The fact they" 
7 meaning the defendants "accepted the payments waives any 
8 violation that implied coverage of fair dealing." I don't 
9 know if that's an accurate transcript but it says the 
10 acceptance of that eliminated their argument that the payment 
11 of rent in this matter violated the implied covenant of good 
12 faith and fair dealing and that's in the transcript. 
13 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Atkin says that you were in 
14 violation, you brought the lawsuit, that puts you to the 
15 point where you stopped violating on a regular basis and he 
16 ought to receive credit for that in terms of attorney's fees. 
17 What's your response to that argument? 
18 MR. MILLER: The rent issue was resolved months 
19 before the lawsuit was filed. It was a separate issue 
20 resolved and Your Honor found there was a waiver on it and 
21 we're done with that issue. When the complaint was filed we 
22 were dealing with the quiet title issue and for those issues 
23 from the complaint, Your Honor clearly granted attorney's 
24 fees. What the defendants are doing is trying to seek 
25 attorney's fees even before this complaint was filed for an 
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1 issue that existed months before and for which they accepted 
2 those payments and Your Honor found that waived the implied 
3 covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They were trying to 
4 reach back months before this litigation was even commenced. 
5 I believe they're separate, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. I'll give you one more bite 
7 at the apple, Mr. Atkin. 
8 MR. ATKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This is the 
9 court's exact language with regard to their conduct. "I 
10 don't find that the lack or the gamesmanship that was played 
11 by the plaintiff to be acceptable conduct if it was indeed to 
12 put pressure on the landlord. I think it is an unsuccessful 
13 way in engaging in some self-help that parties just ought not 
14 to do," and this argument that somehow the timing of the 
15 lawsuit and the ending of the gamesmanship makes some 
16 difference, it does not under the provision of the lease. 
17 The provision in the lease with regard to attorney's 
18 fees is "in any proceeding or controversy associated with or 
19 arising out of this lease or a claimed or actual breach 
20 hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
21 from the other party as part of the prevailing parties' costs 
22 such parties actual and reasonable attorney's fees, costs and 
23 court costs." So, there is some dispute over exactly when 
24 they stopped this practice but they stopped this practice in 
25 response to our letter telling them that they were in breach 
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1 of the lease and that we were therefore seeking to have them 
2 evicted with regard to the lease and then they stopped 
3 practice that this Court found to unacceptable and under the 
4 attorney fee provision we should be entitled to recover fees. 
5 THE COURT: He says you waived it by accepting the 
6 payments. 
7 MR. ATKIN: We may have waived the right to seek 
8 eviction but what we didn't waive was the right to remedy the 
9 conduct that was unacceptable conduct. There may be issues 
10 as to can you accept - we thought that we could accept the 
11 payments and still have them evicted for breaching the 
12 covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There may be some 
13 issue with regard to that. 
14 My colleague just pointed out that the complaint 
15 was filed on August 9 and we sent the demand letter on 
16 September 18 claiming that they were in breach of the 
17 covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
18 But in response to the Court's question, while 
19 there may be some issues as to what remedy we were entitled 
20 to as a result of their gamesmanship or their breach of the 
21 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that doesn't change 
22 the fact that we prevailed in getting them to stop the 
23 conduct that was inappropriate. 
24 THE COURT: So you're saying that the conduct was 
25 still ongoing when you became involved and you took action as 
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1 attorneys to stop that conduct whether it was filing a 
2 lawsuit or writing letters or whatever it was and that the 
3 conduct eventually did stop and you're asserting that it 
4 stopped at least in part because of what you were doing as 
5 attorneys? 
6 MR. ATKIN: That's correct. 
7 THE COURT: All right, thankg. 
8 MR. MILLER: If I may, one quick comment? 
9 THE COURT: Sure. 
10 MR. MILLER: Counsel was reading from the 
11 transcript but stopped at this point. He mentioned "I think 
12 it's an unsuccessful way of engaging in some self-help the 
13 parties had ought not to do." The very next sentence, "On 
14 the other hand I'm not going to find it to be a violation of 
15 the lease." You then found that with respect to the lawsuit 
16 you didn't grant attorney's fees. I think it's clear that 
17 you found it not to be a violation of the lease or the 
18 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but as to 
19 the lawsuit and the quiet title issues, granted fee. 
20 THE COURT: He's saying that regardless of what I 
21 ordered then that I should order fees because of what he did 
22 to have you stop that conduct and that he came in with that 
23 conduct ongoing. I don't know whether there were phone calls 
24 or letters or the complaint itself but eventually the conduct 
25 stopped because of his involvement. Address that. 
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1 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, I've addressed just in the 
2 past whta I thought was consistent with your order. We're 
3 now discussing whether or not you should? 
4 THE COURT: Yes. 
5 MR. MILLER: Okay. The conduct that they complain 
6 about all occurred before the initiation of the lawsuit and 
7 resolved before this action. In fact they filed their 
8 counterclaim — 
9 THE COURT: Why was it resolved? How was it 
10 resolved? What caused your client to stop doing what they 
11 were doing? He says, Mr. Atkin says it's because we came in 
12 and we took action, legal action, either writing letters, 
13 making phone calls, somehow intervened and got them to change 
14 their conduct. 
15 MR. MILLER: I don't know. I'd have to ask my 
16 client Your Honor. I personally wasn't involved back then 
17 and I'd be speculating to represent to the Court any 
18 differently. 
19 THE COURT: I'm going to award fees to the extent 
20 that that happened and I don't know how much time was 
21 involved but you can go through your records and if you find 
22 that you were writing letters of whatever you were doing on 
23 that issue, I think I'll awards fees for that. I won't award 
24 fees beyond that on that issue. 
25 MR. MILLER: So that I'm clear, Your Honor, you're 
1 still finding that it is not a breach of the implied covenant 
2 of good faith and fair dealing nor a violation of the lease 
3 but fees will be awarded to the extent you've just outlined? 
4 THE COURT: Yes. And the reason I'm doing that is 
5 because I think the conduct was unacceptable under the lease 
6 and he had to come in to get them to stop and so they stopped 
7 it. I didn't find because they had stopped it, because he'd 
8 been accepting the payments and so forth and as time went on, 
9 I didn't find it as a violation but I found it as 
10 unacceptable conduct that was required. I don't know how 
11 much time it took you to do that thought. 
12 MR. ATKIN: We'll file a supplemental affidavit in 
13 regard to that, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. So, now with respect to the 
15 order, do we need to change any wording of the order to 
16 reflect all of this? I think the second to the last sentence 
17 I'm going to insert with the limitations described by the 
18 Court during the May 1st hearing. Okayt 
19 MR. ATKIN: Fair enough. Thank you, Your Honor. I 
20 take it the Court is willing to sign an order with that? 
21 THE COURT: I have signed the order with that 
22 change. 
23 MR. ATKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Now, you've also submitted a judgment. 
25 Does the defendant have any problem with the form of the 
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1 I judgment? I'm going to amend Paragraph 3 to say as limited 
2 I by the Court on May 1st. 
3 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, is it Your Honor's 
4 intention that this be a final judgment of 54B? The reason I 
5 ask is that language in there about not dismissing the 
6 defense claim about prejudice and the right to amend in the 
7 order, I don't know how that affects it and I'm just asking 
8 for the Court's direction. 
9 MR. ATKIN: Your Honor, we would suggest that this 
10 is not a final order pursuant to 54B because of the right 
11 they have to amend and bring in a third party. 
12 MR. MILLER: I assume we don't do that based on 
13 Your Honor's order today though that this ought to be filed 
14 on a failure, decision not to do that. May I suggest a 
15 solution? 
16 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
17 MR. MILLER: If you were to grant my clients a 
18 certain number of days to amend the complaint, if they do 
19 it's not final. If they don't it becomes final the next day, 
20 next business day following the expiration of that period. I 
21 think that makes it procedurally clear. 
22 THE COURT: I could do that or I could certify it 
23 for an interlocutory appeal, either way. I think it's 
24 probably wise in either event though to limit the time so 
25 that might be a better solution. 
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1 All right, I'm going to amend the third paragraph 
2 of the order which says "Leave is granted to plaintiff to 
3 amend this complaint in this matter so long as the amended 
4 complaint, if any, is filed on or before" what date do you 
5 need? 
6 MR. MILLER: May 20th? I don't know if that's a 
7 business day or not, Your Honor. How about May 21st? 
8 THE COURT: Okay. "On or before May 21, 2007 and 
9 so long as the allegations of the amended complaint require 
10 nothing on the part of the landlord," etc. 
11 Okay. Thank you. Anything further that we need to 
12 do on this today? 
13 MR. MILLER: Just a clarification. If on May 22nd 
14 no amended complaint is filed, is this a final judgment? 
15 THE COURT: I think the Appellate Court decides 
16 whether something is a final judgment or not but in my view 
17 it's final. 
18 MR. MILLER: All right. Second thing is you made a 
19 comment in the order I believe that as long as the 
20 allegations don't require anything from the defendants, does 
21 that include responding to it because an amended complaint, I 
22 would have them as a party. They can <jo with that as they 
23 wish but it might require an answer. Do I violate the 
24 Court's order by doing that? 
25 THE COURT: I don't think so. I contemplated that 
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there would be minimal effort required by the other side if 
you do file an amended complaint so I don't think filing a 
minimal answer would be in violation. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I don't think that's creating a serious 
problem for. . . 
MR. ATKIN: My understanding from the prior 
hearing, Your Honor, is that all that would be required to do 
is to agree that there is no easement and we're not 
contesting their attempt to establish that there is no 
easement. 
THE COURT: Yes, so then you could file some kind 
of an answer so stating. 
MR. ATKIN: Okay. Thank you Your Honor. 
MR. MILLER: I just don't want to be in violation 
of the order. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Okay. Any other questions or issues that we need 
to talk about? 
MR. ATKIN: I don't believe so Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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